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The Taxation of Thieves and Their Victims:
Everyone Loses But Uncle Sam
Christine Manolakas*
I.

INTRODUCTION

It took decades, but the Supreme Court ultimately decided that profits
from illegal activities are included in the income of the wrongdoer.
Unfortunately, the inclusion of illegal income was the only issue that was
clearly settled. This Article discusses the federal tax laws as they apply to
criminals and their victims, including many nontax legal and social issues.
Part II describes the history and evolution of the case law that resulted
in the inclusion in income of profits from all types of illegal activities,
including embezzlement and extortion. Initially, a determination must be
made as to whether an activity or transaction constitutes theft for tax
purposes. Are misappropriations with the immediate intent to repay a theft
or transactions couched as loans or investment opportunities in reality
fraudulent? With the inclusion of illegal income, criminals are required to
file a tax return and report all illegal income on the return despite the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Questions also arise as to
whether the tax laws should be used to punish criminals for other crimes
and whether tax evaders can receive a fair trial with evidence of other
crimes admitted at trial. Important to victims of theft is the section of the
article exploring the priority of federal tax liens over the victim’s claim for
restitution from any money or property held by the wrongdoer. Next, Part
II examines the various methods used by the Internal Revenue Service to
detect unreported income. Special attention is given to penalties imposed
on the nonfiling of tax returns or the nonreporting of income by criminals,
ranging from negligence to fraud, both civil and criminal, and the
possibility of prison sentences. Finally, as illegal activities are often
businesses or activities engaged in for profit, the availability of deductions
for expenses and losses incurred is an important consideration for
criminals.
Part III explores the tax consequences to the victims of illegal
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activities. A detailed discussion follows as to the allowability and
characterization of theft losses, whether of money or property, and the
recognition and characterization of gains from the theft of property. A
discussion of the amount and timing of theft losses allowed by I.R.C.
section 165 and of bad debt deductions allowed by I.R.C. section 166 is
also provided. Typically, a theft results in a loss deduction but,
counterintuitively, a theft of property may result in a gain. The ability to
defer gain realized pursuant to I.R.C. section 1033 is explored. The article
examines the Tax Benefit Rule as it applies to the receipt of previously
deducted theft losses and possible application of the net operating loss
provisions. The tax treatment of theft loss and gain in the computation of
taxable income of an individual is then discussed, focusing on the tax
treatment of itemized deductions. The article ends with a detailed
examination of tax treatment of losses from fraudulent investment schemes.
Generally, taxpayers prefer a loss characterized as an ordinary theft loss as
opposed to a restricted capital investment loss. In 2009, the Internal
Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 2009-9 and Revenue Procedure
2009-20 that provide the tax treatment and guidelines for claiming theft
losses from Ponzi schemes. A more difficult analysis is the tax treatment
of losses produced by other types of fraudulent investment schemes.
II. TAXATION OF THIEVES
A. INCLUSION OF UNLAWFUL INCOME
The final determination that income from all types of criminal activity
is included in gross income for federal tax purposes was reached “after a
series of confusing and conflicting Supreme Court decisions.”1 The
Revenue Act of 1913, enacted shortly after the passage of the Sixteenth
Amendment,2 taxed income from multiple sources, including “the
transaction of any lawful business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or
profits and income derived from any source whatever.”3 Without
comment, Congress eliminated the word “lawful” from the statute three
years later.4
During Prohibition,5 the Treasury Department relied on this

1. 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS, ¶ 6.4, at 6–27 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 3d ed. 1999).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (giving Congress the power to “lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to
any census or enumeration”).
3. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2(b), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
4. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757.
5. National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1921), repealed by CullenHarrison Act, ch. 4, 48 Stat. 16 (1933).
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unexplained change in the definition of “gross income” to prosecute
bootleggers who failed to report income from their illegal traffic in liquor,
arguing that the change manifested a legislative intent to tax the profits of
unlawful as well as lawful activities.6 However, the Supreme Court
struggled for decades with the question of whether income from illegal
activity is included in income for the purposes of federal income taxation.7
In Sullivan v. United States,8 the taxpayer was a bootlegger who
generated profit from the illegal sale of liquor.9 In defense of not filing a
tax return, the taxpayer contended: (1) unlawful gains are not within the
meaning of income under the Internal Revenue Code;10 and (2) in any
event, the duty of filing a tax return violated the Fifth Amendment,
providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against oneself.11 The Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress did
not intend to allow an individual unlawfully employed to avoid taxation
and thereby increase the burdens of individuals lawfully employed.12
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that to require a tax return “from one
whose income is derived from a violation of criminal law is in conflict with
the Fifth Amendment.”13
The Supreme Court, in Sullivan,14 agreed with the Fourth Circuit that
the taxpayer’s illegal income was subject to tax.15 With regard to the
Fourth Circuit’s finding that the requirement of a tax return violated the
privilege against self-incrimination granted by the Fifth Amendment, the
Supreme Court stated: “It would be an extreme if not an extravagant
application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it authorized a man to
refuse to state the amount of his income because it had been made in
crime.”16 The Supreme Court concluded that the taxpayer must raise the
objection on the tax return but cannot refuse to file a tax return.17

6. BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, ¶ 4.06, at 4-41 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 3d ed. 2002).
7. Id.
8. Sullivan v. United States, 15 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1926) [hereinafter Sullivan I].
9. Id. at 810.
10. All references to the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) are to the 1986 Internal Revenue
Code, codified under Title 26 of the United States Code, as amended, or Treasury Regulations
promulgated thereunder.
11. Sullivan I, 15 F.2d at 810.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) [hereinafter Sullivan II].
15. Id. Justice Holmes stated, “We see no reason to doubt the interpretation of the Act, or any
reason why the fact that a business is unlawful should exempt it from paying taxes that if lawful it
would have to pay.” Id.
16. Id. at 263–64.
17. Id. at 263.
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1. Embezzlement and Extortion
In Sullivan, the income was obtained through unlawful conduct but
not the type of unlawful conduct, such as embezzlement or extortion,
resulting in a legal obligation under state law to make restitution. Almost
twenty years later, in Commissioner v. Wilcox,18 the Supreme Court held
that embezzled funds are not included in gross income because, as in the
case of a loan, the funds are received subject to an obligation of
repayment.19
In Wilcox, the taxpayer was a bookkeeper who embezzled from his
employer, losing most of the embezzled funds in gambling houses.20 The
Supreme Court noted that the inclusion of income is conditioned upon: (1)
the presence of a claim of right; and (2) the absence of a definite,
unconditional obligation to repay or return.21 Accepting the loan analogy,
the Supreme Court determined that embezzled funds do not constitute
income because the taxpayer did not have a bona fide claim to the funds
and had an unqualified obligation to repay the funds.22 Even though the
embezzler dissipated the funds, the Supreme Court asserted that recovery
by the victim would be jeopardized if the embezzler were required to pay
part of the embezzled funds to satisfy a tax liability.23 To permit a tax
would serve only to give the United States an unjustified preference to
money that rightfully belongs to the taxpayer’s employer.24
Six years later, in Rutkin v. United States,25 the Supreme Court
addressed whether money obtained by extortion is income.26 The taxpayer
extorted $250,000 from his former partner in a bootlegging business by
threats to kill him and his family.27 Although extortion resembles
embezzlement in imposing an obligation to reimburse the victim, the
Supreme Court held that the extorted funds were included in the
extortionist’s income.28 Again applying a claim of right rational, the

18. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
19. Id. at 408–409.
20. Id. at 406.
21. Id. at 408 (citing N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnett, 286 U.S. 417 (1932)). See N. Am. Oil, 286
U.S. at 424 (defining the Claim of Right Doctrine as follows: “If a taxpayer receives earnings under a
claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required
to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though
he may be still be adjudge liable to restore its equivalent.”).
22. Wilcox, 327 U.S. at 408.
23. Id. at 414.
24. Id. at 411.
25. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
26. Id. at 131.
27. Id. at 134.
28. Id. at 138–39. But see id. at 139–40 (Black, J. dissenting) (arguing that like an embezzler, an
extortionist has no legal or equitable claim to the money and is under a continuing obligation to return
the money, therefore, has not received taxable income any more than if the extortionist borrowed the
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Supreme Court noted that a taxpayer derives economic value from
unlawful gain, as well as lawful gain, and, if the taxpayer has control over
the funds, the taxpayer has the freedom to dispose of the funds at will.29
Practically, a victim of extortion is more likely to be silent because of the
fear of exposure or violence, making it less likely that the extortionist will
be asked to make restitution.30
The distinction between embezzled funds and extorted funds for tax
purposes lasted for nine years. Finally, in James v. United States,31 the
Supreme Court held that embezzled funds constituted income.32 The
taxpayer, a union official, embezzled more than $700,000 from his union
and an insurance company doing business with his union.33 The Supreme
Court overruled its decision in Wilcox and held that income from illegal
activity is taxable despite the legal obligation of the wrongdoer to make
restitution.34 The embezzler does not intend to honor the obligation to
make restitution and, as a practical matter, has sufficient control over the
funds to derive an economic benefit.35 If restitution is made to the victim,
the embezzler may deduct the amount repaid in the tax year in which
repayment is made.36
2. Questionable Circumstances
With the James decision, gross income includes all illegal receipts,
even if the type of crime subjects the wrongdoer to an obligation to repay
or if the wrongdoer promises restitution.37 Even a prompt promise to repay
does not convert a taxable theft into a nontaxable loan.38 Nevertheless, the

money; but agreeing that the business profits from the criminal activity should be taxed the same
manner as the profits from a lawful activity, if the criminal activity constituted a business).
29. Id. at 137. Cf. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (defining
“gross income” as “accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete
dominion.”).
30. Id. at 138.
31. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (as amended in
1993) (including illegal gains into gross income). See generally Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d (RIA) ¶ J1601 (listing, with citations, cases in which income derived from questionable transactions or
businesses was included, or not included, in income, including: bookmaking; bootleg liquor; bribes;
campaign contributions in exchange for a politician’s influence; drugs; embezzlement; espionage;
extortion; fraudulent schemes; graft; illegal bonus to corporate director; kickbacks; profits from illegal
use of corporate assets; prostitution and massage; skimming of receipts; slot machines; swindling;
transactions in foreign currency obtained at illegal exchange rates; unlawful insurance policies; and
usurious interest).
32. James 366 U.S. at 221–22.
33. Id. at 214.
34. Id. at 221.
35. Id. at 219.
36. Id. at 220.
37. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 4.06, at 4–42.
38. See Norman v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 181 (1968), aff’d per curiam, 407 F.2d 1337
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Internal Revenue Service (Service) allows the netting of the amount of the
repayment from the amount misappropriated when the misappropriation
and the repayment occur in the same tax year.39 If restitution is made to the
victim, a deduction is allowed for the amount paid in the year of the
repayment.40 An exception to inclusion may have been carved out if there
is a consensual recognition of the obligation to repay.41
In Gilbert v. Commissioner,42 the taxpayer, who was president,
principal stockholder, and director of a corporation, made unauthorized
withdrawals of nearly $2,000,000 of corporate funds.43 Believing that he
was acting in the best interest of the corporation, the taxpayer withdrew the
funds to facilitate the merger of another company into the corporation.44
The taxpayer promptly informed several, but not all, of the corporate
officers and directors of the withdrawals.45 Within two weeks, the taxpayer
made a complete accounting of the withdrawals to the corporation’s
directors, officers, and outside counsel, and signed demand notes secured
by the assignment of property with a net value in excess of the amount
withdrawn.46 The Board of Directors accepted the notes and assignment
but refused to ratify the unauthorized withdrawals.47 In time, the Service
filed tax liens against the taxpayer and the corporation, which failed to file
the assignment, was subordinate in priority to the tax lien.48 Finding no
consensual recognition of the obligation to repay because the corporation
was unaware of the withdrawals, the Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer
realized income when he made the unauthorized withdrawals from the
corporation and that his efforts at restitution did not entitle him to an offset

(3d Cir. 1969) (entering into a repayment agreement with the employer does not convert the receipt of
embezzled funds into a loan); Quinn v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1975) (giving a
promissory note to the victimized bank does not prevent the funds from being included in the
embezzler’s gross income); Taylor v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1197 (1997) (executing a
confession of judgement note to the victimized bank in the year of the check-kiting scheme does not
convert the income from the check-kiting scheme into a loan). But see Gaddy v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 943
(1962), reversed in part on other issues, 344 F.2d 460 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that where the taxpayer
mistakenly obtains funds and in the same year recognizes a fixed and definite obligation to repay and
makes provision for repayment, the taxpayer is not required to include the amount obtained in income
even though repayment occurred in a later year).
39. I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. CC:TL-N-2502-94 (Apr. 8, 1994).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 280-306 (detailing the tax treatment of restitution
payments).
41. Donald DePass, Reconsidering the Classification of Illegal Income, 66 TAX LAW. 771, 777
(2013).
42. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 552 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1977).
43. Id. at 479.
44. Id. at 481.
45. Id. at 479.
46. Id. at 481.
47. Id. at 480.
48. Id.
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against his income.49
The Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court and held, based on the
atypical facts of the case, that the funds withdrawn were not income to the
taxpayer.50 The Second Circuit did not interpret James to require the
realization of income in every case of unlawful withdrawals by a
taxpayer.51 The Second Circuit stated:
We conclude that where a taxpayer withdraws funds from a
corporation which he fully intends to repay and which he expects
with reasonable certainty he will be able to repay, where he
believes that his withdrawals will be approved by the corporation,
and where he makes a prompt assignment of assets sufficient to
secure the amount owed, he does not realize income on the
withdrawals under the James test. When Gilbert acquired the
money, there was an express consensual recognition of his
obligation to repay: the secretary of the corporation, who signed
the checks, the officers and directors to whom Gilbert gave
contemporaneous notification, and Gilbert himself were all aware
that the transaction was in the nature of a loan.52
The theft-loan dichotomy may be relevant if the taxpayer is claiming to
borrow money for legitimate business reasons but is actually engaged in
swindling investors.53 The proceeds from a bona fide loan are not included
in income because the financial benefit is offset by a contemporaneously
acknowledged obligation to repay.54 Although whether a bona fide debtorcreditor relationship exists is a question of fact, an essential element is the
intent of the recipient of the funds to repay and the intent of the person
advancing the funds to require repayment.55 However, a swindler is
obtaining money through a false pretense or device; therefore, the amount
of money obtained is included in the income of the swindler.56

49. Id.
50. Id. at 481–82. Cf. Collins v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d 625 (2nd Cir. 1993) (distinguishing
Gilbert, the court found that the larcenist had no reasonable expectation in his ability to repay, had no
reason to believe his employer would approve his actions, and was not motivated by assisting his
employer).
51. Gilbert, 552 F.2d at 481.
52. Id. at 481–82.
53. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 4.06, at 4-4243.
54. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 307 (1983).
55. Welch v. Commissioner, 204 F.3rd 1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 2000). Although no single factor is
determinative, factors considered in determining whether a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship exists
include: (1) whether the promise to repay is evidenced by a note or other instrument; (2) whether
interest is charged; (3) whether a fixed schedule for repayments is made; (4) whether collateral is given
to secure payment; (5) whether repayments are made; (6) whether the borrower has a reasonable
prospect of repaying the loan and whether the lender has sufficient funds to advance the loan; and (7)
whether the parties conduct themselves as if the transaction is a loan. Id.
56. Rollinger v. United States, 208 F2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 1953).
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In In Re Diversifies Brokers Co., Inc.,57 the Eighth Circuit refused to
follow the holding of the Supreme Court in James.58 The principal source
of income of the corporate taxpayer was cash received from lenders, who
were promised high rates of interest and misled as to the taxpayer’s
business, in exchange for short-term notes issued by the taxpayer.59 Before
the maturity date of each note, the noteholder had the option to redeem the
note for cash, or accept a new note for the face amount of the old note and
receive accrued interest in either cash or an additional note.60 In fact, the
taxpayer was not engaged in any profitable business, and the corporate
officers were illegally diverting a substantial portion of the corporate funds
for their own use.61 The activity of the taxpayer was a Ponzi-type scheme
under which the corporation was obtaining more loans in order to pay off
the previous loans.62 Eventually, the officers were convicted of securities
and mail fraud, and the corporation was put in receivership for violations of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. In addition, the U.S. government
filed a claim against the bankrupted corporation for unpaid income tax plus
interest.63
The Bankruptcy Referee denied the government’s claim that the
amounts “borrowed” from investors by the corporation were income,
finding: (1) the transactions were bona fide loans as between the taxpayer
and the lenders; (2) the taxpayer honored all requests for repayment, made
substantial repayments, and had a considerable bank balance at time of
receivership; and (3) the taxpayer was a mere conduit and received no
benefit from the receipt of the funds.64 The Referee concluded that it would
be ‘unthinkable’ to tax the bankrupted corporation on its receipts thereby
substantially impairing the ability of the innocent lenders to recover their

57. Diversified Brokers Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1973). See Kreimer v.
Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 260 (1983) (stating that the issue is not whether the taxpayers
engaged in improper conduct but whether they intended to repay the funds, “a finding of fraudulent
conduct does not in itself establish the lack of intent to repay”). But see Moore v. United States, 412
F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1969) (finding that although the swindler had an intention and contractual obligation
to make repayments, no agreement existed between the actual lender and borrower, establishing a
“consensual recognition” of an obligation to repay and the exact conditions of repayment); O’Sheeran
v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 405 (1983) (holding that funds borrowed from the corporation
were includible in income because the taxpayer had total control over the funds, deposited the funds
into a personal account, and used the funds to support himself without obligation or intention of
repayment); United States v. Rochelle, 384 F.2d 748 (1967) (finding that the funds were included in the
income of a confidence man even though the victims “lent” the money to the swindler).
58. Diversified Brokers Co., 487 F.2d at 358. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38
(discussing the James decision in which Supreme Court rejected the theft-loan dichotomy).
59. Id. at 355.
60. Id. at 35556.
61. Id. at 356.
62. Id. at 355.
63. Id. at 35657.
64. Id. at 357.
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loans.”65 The District Court affirmed the Referee’s decision and adopted
his opinion.66 Although recognizing that the taxpayer was unable to repay
all of the loans with interest because of the pyramiding nature of the
scheme and the corporate officers’ embezzlements, the Eighth Circuit
agreed with the District Court that the James decisions was not
controlling.67 The record supported the Referee’s findings that there was an
express agreement to repay the loans with interest and many repayments
were made, and the proceeds of the loans were used for the benefit of the
officers and not the taxpayer.68 The James decision applies to the corporate
officers, requiring them to include the funds embezzled from the
corporation in their income.69 The Eighth Circuit also stated that the
government’s underlying reason for extending the James rational to this
case and similar cases was, “[i]ts chances of gaining additional tax
revenues at the expense of the defrauded lenders would be substantially
increased.”70
B. FIFTH AMENDMENT AND AL CAPONE
The Fifth Amendment mandates “No person shall . . . be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . .”71 As interpreted, a
taxpayer may assert Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination.72 To claim the privilege, a defendant must
be faced with a situation in which the hazards of self-incrimination are
“real and appreciable” and not merely “imaginary and unsubstantial.”73
The privilege encompasses not only answers that would in themselves
support a conviction but also “embraces those which would furnish a link
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal
crime.”74 In tax matters, the Fifth Amendment may be asserted in civil or
criminal investigations, litigation, and prosecutions.75 The party seeking to
deny access to evidence must establish the basis for the privilege.76

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 358.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
72. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000).
73. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968).
74. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
75. MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ¶ 12.05[12][b][ii]
(2nd ed. 1991). See Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 66263 (1976) (finding that the privilege
against self-incrimination is an absolute defense to Section 7203, penalty for willful failure to file a tax
return). See infra text accompanying notes 195200 (discussing the criminal fraud penalty provided in
Section 7203, willful failure to file a return, supply information, or pay tax).
76. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 12.05[12][a].
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As previously stated, the Supreme Court, in Sullivan, agreed with the
Fourth Circuit that income from illegal bootlegging was taxable but
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit’s requirement that a tax return violated
the bootlegger’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.77
The not filing of a tax return or the filing of an incomplete tax return is not
protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.78 Thus, the taxpayer cannot
make a blanket refusal to file a tax return or to furnish the information
requested but must assert the Fifth Amendment privilege to the specific
information required on the tax return.79 With regard to criminal activity,
the information required on the tax return that may be incriminating is the
source of income, type of business, and amount of income.80 Tax returns
filed under penalties of perjury are a source of evidence for the government
against taxpayers in an ongoing criminal investigation, in a civil tax audit
with a potential for criminal referral, or with regard to illegal sources of
income.81
As tax cases are often document cases, the taxpayer’s ability to assert
the Fifth Amendment privilege against the production of documents is
critical.82 The Supreme Court has held that documents not prepared under
compulsion are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege.83 For
example, business records of a sole proprietorship are not privileged under
the Fifth Amendment because the records are prepared voluntarily.84
Similarly, as the privilege is personal to the taxpayer, business and tax
records held by the taxpayer’s accountant85 or prepared by the taxpayer’s
accountant and transferred to the taxpayer’s attorney86 are not protected by
the Fifth Amendment privilege. However, under the right circumstances,
documents voluntarily prepared may fall under another privilege such as
the attorney-client privilege.87
As a consequence of the inclusion of illegal income into income, the
government has used the tax laws to punish a wrongdoer for the criminal

77. Sullivan II, 274 U.S. at 263. See supra text accompanying notes 8–17 (discussing the Supreme
Court’s holding, in Sullivan II, that the profits from a bootlegging operation were included in income).
78. Id. But see Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 4142 (holding the defendant’s assertion of the Fifth
Amendment valid if the information required on the tax return is for general criminal conduct).
79. Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228, 240 (9th Cir. 1974), aff’d, Gardner v. United States, 424
U.S. 648 (1976). A tax return that does not contain the necessary information necessary to compute the
taxpayer’s tax liability is not a return within the meaning of the Code. United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d
519, 523 (10th Cir. 1970).
80. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 12.05[12][b][iii].
81. Stephen E. Silver, The “Tax Crime Exception” to Taking the Fifth Does Not Exist, 86 J. TAX’N
224, 224 (April 1997).
82. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 12.05[12][b][iv].
83. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 34 (2000).
84. United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 (1984).
85. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973).
86. Fisher v. United States 425 U.S. 391 413–14, (1976).
87. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 12.05[12][b][iv].
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conduct that generated the income and not to enforce the tax laws or
penalize for the failure to comply with the tax laws.88 In 1931, Alphonse
Capone, a gangster during the Prohibition era, was prosecuted, convicted,
and sentenced to eleven years imprisonment for tax evasion.89 This
selective enforcement of the tax laws against taxpayers with income from
illegal sources is referred to as the “Al Capone syndrome.”90 The concern
is using the tax laws to punish wrongdoers whose principal offense are
other crimes, such as racketeering, black market activities, or giving or
accepting bribes.91 Conversely, if the wrongdoer is guilty of two crimes,
the crime under the tax laws should not be ignored because the other more
serious crime is not being prosecuted.92 Selective prosecution raises an
additional concern of whether the wrongdoer can receive a fair trial.93 The
evidence presented in a tax fraud case of the taxpayer’s criminal history
and associations may color the conclusions of the jury.94
C. RECONSTRUCTING INCOME
The scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, with respect to the inclusion of illegal income on tax returns,
remains unclear.95 If included, wrongdoers often supply a name, address,
and net income, label the income “miscellaneous income” or “income from
various sources,” and leave the rest of the tax return blank.96 Such tax
returns invite scrutiny by the Service; however, taxpayers are rarely
prosecuted for failure to supply complete information.97 Instead, the
Service attempts to verify the amounts of income listed on the tax return by

88. Boris I. Bittker, Taxing Income from Unlawful Activities, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 130, 131–
32 (1974-75). See generally id..at 130 (discussing the pros and cons of the inclusion of illegal income
into gross income and the “Al Capone syndrome”).
89. Bittker, supra note 88, at 130–31, 141. See Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927 (7th Cir.
1932) (upholding the conviction of Alphonse Gabriel Capone for willfully attempting to evade and
defeat income tax). See also Capone v. United States, 51 f.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1931) (upholding the
conviction of Raffaele (Ralph “Bottles”) James Capone, mobster and older brother of Al Capone, for
willfully failing to pay tax, resulting in a sentenced of three years imprisonment).
90. Bittker, supra note 88, at 141. See id. at 140 (discussing possible methods of discouraging
discriminatory enforcement, including the exemption of unlawful income and the granting of tax
immunity to any taxpayer whose return was selected for audit in an irregular manner).
91. 6 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, 6 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS ¶ 114.9.1 at 11480 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont 2nd ed. 2012).
92. Id.
93. Bittker, supra note 88, at 142–43.
94. Id. See id. (arguing that a tax evasion trial may require only minimal reference to the
wrongdoer’s illegal activities and that the judge in a criminal case can exert sufficient authority over the
jury to insure a fair trial.)
95. Bittker, supra note 88, at 133.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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examining the taxpayer’s financial history.98
A taxpayer is under the obligation to “keep such records, render such
statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations
as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe.”99 If the taxpayer fails to
file a return or files an inaccurate return, or did not keep records or kept
inaccurate records, the Service is given “great latitude” in determining the
taxpayer’s taxable income.100 The Service is not required to use any
particular method of reconstructing income, but may use any method that
clearly reflects the taxable income of the taxpayer.101 Although the Service
has the initial burden of proof, the Service’s reconstruction of taxable
income is presumed correct, and the taxpayer has the burden of proving
that the deficiency notice is arbitrary, capricious, and excessive.102 Finally,
although courts do not require the computation to be exact, the Service
must employ reasonable means and be relatively exact when determining
the taxpayer’s taxable income.103
The foundation for the calculation of assessments and penalties is
taxable income.104 Depending on the facts and circumstances of each
investigation, a taxpayer’s taxable income may be established by direct or
several indirect methods of proof.105 The method most preferred by the
Service is the direct method, referred to as the specific item method.106 The
specific item method of reconstructing income uses a taxpayer’s books and
records in which transactions are contemporaneously recorded and then
summarized on the tax return.107 If a taxpayer fails to keep adequate books
98. Id.
99. I.R.C. § 6001 (West 2017). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) (as amended in 1990) (requiring
taxpayers to “keep permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as are sufficient to
establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or other matters required to be shown by such
person in any return of tax or information”).
100. Ramsey v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1150 (T.C. 1980).
101. Id. The method used by the government to reconstruct income is not conclusive, allowing the
taxpayer to present alternative methods that may be more accurate. Kikalos v. United States, 408 F.3d
900, 903 (7th Cir. 2005).
102. Elizabeth M. Rutherford, Taxation of Drug Traffickers’ Income: What the Drug Trafficker
Profiteth the IRS Taketh Away, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 716 (1991). Once the Service determines gross
income, the taxpayer generally has the burden to prove deductions. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK,
supra note 6, ¶ 43.01 at 432.
103. Rutherford, supra note 102, at 71314.
104. Id. at 712. Generally, the term “taxable income” means a taxpayer’s gross income minus
deductions. I.R.C. § 63(a) (West 2017).
105. I.R.S. IRM § 9.5.9.2(4) (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005009.html#d0e70. Generally, the special agent will gather evidence to determine the amount of income
that the taxpayer should on the tax return and compare that to the amount of income included on the tax
return. Id. § 9.5.9.2.2(1).
106. Id. Even if the direct method is used to reconstruct taxable income, an indirect method may be
used to determine the accuracy of the taxpayer’s books and records. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK,
supra note 6, ¶ 43.01, at 432.
107. I.R.S IRM 9.5.9.2.1(1) (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009.
html#d0e70. The three types of schemes suited for the use of the specific item method are: (1)
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and records, an indirect method of reconstructing taxable income may be
employed.108 The indirect methods of proving income that the courts
upheld are: (1) net worth method; (2) expenditures method; and (3) bank
deposit method.109 Courts have only sustained the findings of fraud if the
taxpayer offers no adequate explanation for the discrepancies between the
expenditures, bank deposits, and increases in net worth and the amount of
income reported on the tax return.110
1. Net Worth Method
The net worth method measures the increase in net worth of the
taxpayer calculated at the beginning and end of each tax year.111 A legacy
of the prohibition era, the net worth method is well suited to search out
unreported income, particularly income from illegal sources.112 This
method of income reconstruction was used to prosecute such notorious
crime figures as the Capones.113 The net worth method is used by the
Service if the taxpayer maintains no books and records or if the taxpayer’s
books and records are not available, inadequate, or withheld.114 The
assumption is that the taxpayer’s increase in net worth, plus the taxpayer’s
nondeductible personal expenses, must have been financed by taxable and
nontaxable income.115 Generally, the difference in the taxpayer’s net worth
from the previous tax year is increased by the amount of personal living
expenses, nondeductible losses, and gifts made, and decreased by any
nontaxable sources of funds, such as gifts and inheritances.116 The Service
must establish an opening net worth with reasonable certainty and prove

understatement of income; (2) overstatement of expenses; and (3) fraudulent claims for credits or
exemptions. Id. § 9.5.9.2.1(2). See Durland v. Commissioner, 112 T.C.M. (CCH) 37 (2016) (holding
that stipulations that the taxpayer received certain payments and that he did not keep adequate records
were sufficient to allow the presumption of correctness to attach to the Service’s determinations and
justified using the specific items method of reconstructing income).
108. Rutherford, supra note 102, at 712.
109. I.R.S. IRM 9.5.9.2.2(3) (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009.
html#d0e70. Two additional indirect methods used by the Service to prove income are the percentage
markup method and the unit and volume method. See id. § 9.5.9.1(1).
110. Id. at § 9.5.9.2.2(3).
111. Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, How the IRS Reconstructs Income Without Records, 42
TAX’N FOR ACCT. (Jan 1992). See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 129 (1954) (sanctioning the
use of the net worth method of reconstructing taxable income).
112. Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion, Insider Trading, and Problems of
Proof, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1421, 1426–27 (1991).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94 (describing the “Al Capone syndrome”).
114. I.R.S. IRM § 9.5.9.5.2(1) (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/ part9/irm_09-005-009.
html#d0e70.
115. Knight & Knight, supra note 111.
116. See generally I.R.S. IRM § 9.5.9.5.8.1 (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/
part9/irm_09-005-009.html#d0e70. See also id., at § 9.5.9.5.8.1(3).
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the unreported income came from a known and likely source.117 The most
common defense used by taxpayers is that the increase in net worth was
caused by a substantial “hoard” of cash from previous years of saving.118
2. Expenditures Method
The expenditures method compares the taxpayer’s expenditures with
the taxpayer’s receipt of income.119 The assumption is that the amount by
which the taxpayer’s expenditures during the tax year exceeds know
sources of income, if unexplained, represent unreported income.120 This
method is similar to the net worth method of reconstructing income.121 The
expenditures method of proof is used if the taxpayer’s net worth has not
substantially changed during the period under investigation or when
significant extravagant living expenditures are apparent.122 Thus, the
taxpayer has spent substantial income on consumable goods and services,
such as food, vacations, and gifts, as opposed to durable goods, such as
Typically, taxpayers claim that
stocks, bonds, and real estate.123
expenditures and increased bank balances are the result of previously
earned income, funds held for other parties, or nontaxable loans.124
3. Bank Deposit Method
The bank deposit method is a means of verifying the taxpayer’s
receipts and expenditures.125 The premise is that the taxpayer’s bank
deposits represent income and, if not income, the taxpayer is in the best
position to explain the nature of the deposits.126 The bank deposit method
requires an analysis of the taxpayer’s bank account(s), which may reveal
unreported income or provide leads to unreported income by tracing the
deposits to their source.127 The Service does not have to prove that the

117. Eads, supra note 112, at 142729. See id., at 142948 (discussing, in detail, the difficulty in
establishing a likely source of nontaxable income and an opening net worth, and the willingness of
appellate courts to affirm convictions despite the government’s inability to meet the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt).
118. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 127 (1954).
119. Knight & Knight, supra note 111.
120. Id. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943) (sanctioning the use of the expenditures
method of reconstructing taxable income).
121. Knight & Knight, supra note 111.
122. I.R.S. IRM § 9.5.9.6.2(1) (2012), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-009.
html#d0e70.
123. Id.
124. Jim Swayze and John C. Zimmerman, IRS Steps Up Indirect Methods of Establishing Income,
52 TAX’N FOR ACCT. (Feb 1994).
125. Id.
126. Knight & Knight, supra note 111.
127. Rutherford, supra note 102, at 728.
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bank deposits are income or establish a likely source of unreported income
as the taxpayer has the burden of proving the deposits represent nontaxable
income.128 Bank deposit reconstructions are justified when the taxpayer has
no or inadequate records or the Service has strong suspicion that the
taxpayer has undisclosed income.129 Again, defenses include undisclosed
gifts, cash hoards, and funds belonging to other parties.130
D. CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CIVIL PENALTIES
Taxpayers engaged in unlawful activities are often liable for unpaid
taxes and civil and criminal penalties. “Congress has imposed a variety of
sanctions for the protection of the system and the revenues.”131 Civil fraud
results in remedial action by the Service, such as assessing the correct tax
and imposing civil penalties as additions to tax, which are assessed and
collected administratively as part of the unpaid balance of assessment.132
Criminal fraud results in punitive action with penalties consisting of fines
and/or imprisonment, which are enforced only by prosecution and are
intended to punish the taxpayer.133 Criminal penalties serve as a deterrent
to other taxpayers.134
1. Civil Penalties
The major difference between civil and criminal fraud is the degree of
proof required by the government.135 In civil cases, the government must
present sufficient evidence to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence
while in criminal cases guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.136
Generally, in civil court proceedings, the taxpayer bears the burden of
proof until the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to
relevant factual issues.137 Nevertheless, the Service has the initial burden to

128. Knight & Knight, supra note 111.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943).
132. I.R.S. IRM § 25.1.1.2.3(1) (2014), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-001001.html#d0e119. If an addition to tax is assessed, the taxpayer also owes interest, compounded daily
from the due date of the return, on both the underpayment and addition to tax. See I.R.C. § 6601(a),
(e)(2) (West 2017); see also § 6621 (establishing the interest rate on underpayments as three percent
over the federal short-term rate determined under Section 1274(d)); § 6622 (West 2017) (establishing
that interest compounds daily); § 6665(a) (West 2017) (treating additions to tax in the same matter as
the income tax).
133. I.R.S. IRM § 25.1.1.2.3(2) (2014), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/ part25/irm_25-001001.html#d0e119.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 25.1.1.2.2(2).
136. Id.
137. I.R.C. § 7491(a) (West 2017).
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produce evidence to impose a penalty, an addition to tax, or an additional
amount imposed by the tax laws.138
It has been stated that the Internal Revenue Code contains “a mindnumbing assortment” of civil penalties.139 The following are the civil tax
penalties that commonly apply to taxpayers involved in illegal activities:
a. I.R.C. Section 6651—Failure to File a Tax Return or to Pay Tax
If a taxpayer fails to file a tax return or fails to pay the tax shown, or
required to have been shown, on a tax return, a penalty is imposed unless
the taxpayer shows that the delay resulted from a reasonable cause and not
willful neglect.140 The penalty for failure to file a return is five percent of
the amount the taxpayer was required to show for the first month, plus an
additional five percent for each month thereafter, not to exceed twenty-five
percent.141 If the failure to file is due to fraudulent intent, the penalty for
failure to file a timely tax return increases to fifteen percent per month with
a maximum of seventy-five percent.142 The Service has the burden to prove
the failure to file was with fraudulent intent in order to impose the penalty
for fraud.143 The penalty for failure to pay the tax in a timely manner is 0.5
percent of the amount shown on the tax return for the first month, plus an
additional 0.5 percent for each month thereafter, not to exceed twenty-five
percent.144
Generally, the Service will not impose the failure to file or pay penalty
on any portion of an underpayment if the taxpayer can show a reasonable
and good faith effort to comply.145 Special circumstances that warrant
relief include the following: (1) taxpayer exercised ordinary business care
or prudence but due to circumstances beyond the taxpayer’s control was
unable to comply with the tax law; (2) death, serious injury, or unavoidable

138. § 7491(c).
139. Michael Asimow, Civil Penalties for Inaccurate and Delinquent Tax Returns, 23 UCLA L.
REV. 637, 637 (1976).
140. I.R.C. § 6651(a) (West 2017).
141. § 6651(a)(1). If a timely return is not filed, the taxpayer will usually fail to pay the tax due and
will therefore be subject to penalties for both failure to file and late payment; however, in such
circumstance, the penalties will offset each other so that the net result will equal the failure to file
penalty. § 6651(c)(1).
142. § 6651(f).
143. I.R.C. § 7454 (West 2017). See infra text accompanying notes 167-71 (listing the factors
considered by the Service in establishing fraudulent intent).
144. I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2), (3).
145. I.R.S. IRM § 20.1.1.3.2.1 (2014), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001001r.html. For relief from the failure to file or pay penalty, the taxpayer must make an affirmative
showing of all facts alleged as a reasonable cause for the failure to file or pay. Treas. Reg. § 301.66511(c)(1) (as amended in 2004). The Supreme Court held that relief is warranted if a taxpayer relied on
an attorney or accountant for advice on a matter of tax law but not if a taxpayer relied on a tax advisor
to prepare and file a timely tax return. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1985).
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absence of the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s immediate family; (3) fire,
casualty, natural disaster, or other disturbance; (4) inability to obtain
records necessary to comply with a tax obligation; and (5) receipt of, and
reliance on, erroneous tax advice.146 Reasonable cause is shown for failure
to pay tax if the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and prudence but
was unable to pay or would suffer undue hardship if payment was made on
the due date. 147 Lavish or extravagant personal spending and speculative or
illiquid investments are inconsistent with a showing of reasonable care and
prudence.148
b. I.R.C. Section 6662—Accuracy Related Penalty on Underpayments
The accuracy related penalty on underpayments attaches to specified
proscribed conduct, including: (1) negligence or disregard of tax rules and
regulations;149 and (2) a substantial underpayment of tax.150 Generally, the
accuracy related penalty will not be imposed on any portion of an
underpayment if the taxpayer shows a reasonable and good faith effort to
comply with the tax laws.151 The penalty is twenty percent of the
underpayment attributable to the proscribed conduct.152
With regard to the penalty for “negligence or disregard of rule or
regulations,” the term “negligence” includes any failure to make a
reasonable attempt to comply with the tax laws, exercise ordinary care in
tax return preparation, or keep adequate books and records.153 The penalty
for negligence will not apply if the taxpayer’s position has a reasonable
basis.154 “Disregard” includes any careless, reckless, or intentional

146. I.R.S. IRM § 20.1.1.3.2.2 (2014), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001001r.html; § 20.1.1.3.2.2(1); § 20.1.1.3.2.2(2); § 20.1.1.3.2.2(3); § 20.1.1.3.2.2(5).
147. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2004). For purposes of an extension of the time
for payment of tax, the term “undue hardship” means more than inconvenience but means substantial
financial loss, e.g., sale of property at a sacrifice price, will result from payment on the due date. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6161-1(b) (as amended in 1973).
148. Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2004).
149. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1), (c) (West 2017).
150. § 6662(b)(2), (d). The additional proscribed conduct for which the accuracy related penalty
imposed are: (1) any substantial valuation misstatement; (2) any substantial overstatement of pension
liabilities; (3) any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement; and (4) transactions lacking
economic substance. § 6662(b). The penalty is increased to forty percent in the case of nondisclosed
noneconomic substance transactions. § 6662(i).
151. § 6664(c)(1).
152. § 6662(a). The maximum accuracy related penalty that will apply is twenty percent of the
understatement even though the understatement is attributable to two or more of the proscribed
conducts. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c) (as amended in 2003).
153. I.R.C. § 6662(c) (West 2017); see also I.R.S. IRM § 20.1.5.7.1(1) (2016), https://www.
irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-005.html; Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 (as amended in 2003) (providing
details of the statutory definition of “negligence”).
154. I.R.S. IRM § 20.1.5.7.1(3) (2016), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-005.html.
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disregard of tax statutes and regulations.155 The penalty for disregard of tax
statutes and regulations does not apply if the taxpayer adequately discloses
the position and the position represents a good faith challenge to the
regulations.156
A “substantial understatement” of tax occurs if the amount of the
understatement exceeds the greater of: (1) ten percent of the tax required to
be shown on the return; or (2) $5,000.157 The accuracy related penalty will
not be imposed on any portion of an underpayment if the taxpayer shows a
reasonable and good faith effort to comply with the tax laws.158 The
amount of the understatement is reduced by the portion attributed to: (1)
substantial authority for the position taken; or (2) relevant facts adequately
disclosed on the tax return and a reasonable basis for the tax treatment of
the item.159 The penalty imposed by I.R.C. section 6662 will not apply to
any portion of an underpayment for which a fraud penalty is imposed by
I.R.C. section 6663.160
c. I.R.C. Section 6663—Imposition of Civil Fraud Penalty
Typically, the civil fraud penalty is imposed on a taxpayer generating
illegal income.161 The amount of the penalty is seventy-five percent of the
portion of the underpayment attributable to fraud.162 The Service must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the taxpayer is guilty of
fraudulent intent to evade taxes.163 Once the Service establishes that any
portion of the underpayment is attributable to fraud, the entire
underpayment is so treated, except any portion of the underpayment that
the taxpayer establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, not to be
attributable to fraud.164 The fraud penalty is not imposed on any portion of
the underpayment if the taxpayer shows a reasonable and good faith effort
to comply with the tax laws.165 I.R.C. section 6663 applies only to tax
returns filed; nevertheless, pursuant to I.R.C. section 6651(f), a

155. I.R.C. § 6662(c).
156. I.R.S. IRM § 20.1.5.7.2.1(3) (2016), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part20/irm_20-001-005.html.
157. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A).
158. § 6664(c)(1) (West 2017).
159. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B). If any portion of the understatement is attributable to a tax shelter a
more rigorous test is applied. § 6662(d)(2)(C).
160. § 6662(b).
161. Megan L. Brackney, When Crime Doesn’t Pay: The Tax Consequences of Criminal Conduct,
103 J. TAX’N 303, 304 (Nov 2005).
162. I.R.C. § 6663(a) (West 2017). If a joint return is filed, the fraud penalty will not apply to a
spouse unless some part of underpayment is due to the fraud of that spouse. § 6663(c).
163. DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 873 (1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 16 (2nd Cir. 1992).
164. I.R.C. § 6663(b).
165. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (West 2017). Intent to evade is distinguished from “inadvertence, reliance
on incorrect technical advice, sincerely held difference of opinion, negligence or carelessness.” I.R.S.
IRM § 25.1.6.1 (2016), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-001-006.html.
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corresponding seventy-five percent delinquency penalty is imposed for
fraudulent failure to file a tax return. As to both I.R.C. sections 6663 and
6651(f), the Service must apply the same standards in proving fraudulent
intent.166
As distinguished from negligence, fraud is always intentional.167
Since direct proof of fraud is rarely available, the Service must prove fraud
by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences.168 Generally, fraud
involves one or more of the following elements: deception;
misrepresentation of material facts; false or altered documents; and
evasion.169 Although a determination of fraud is based on a taxpayer’s
entire course of action, some of the common indicators considered by the
Service in evidencing an “intent to evade tax” are as follows: (1)
understatement of income, e.g., omission of specific items or sources of
income or substantial income; (2) fictitious or improper deductions, e.g.,
overstatement of expenses; (3) accounting irregularities, e.g., two sets of
books and false entries; (4) obstructive actions of the taxpayer, e.g., false
statements, destruction of records, transfer or concealment of assets, and
failure to cooperate with the examiner; (5) consistent pattern of
underreporting income; (6) implausible or inconsistent explanations; (7)
engaging in illegal activities or attempting to conceal illegal activities; (8)
inadequate records; (9) dealing in cash; (10) failure to file returns; and (11)
education and experience.170 Deficiencies resulting from the exercise of
judgement, a good faith misunderstanding of the law or a good faith belief
that the taxpayer is not violating the law, are seldom the basis for the fraud
penalty.171
2. Criminal Penalties
Criminal tax penalties, which include fines and/or terms of
imprisonment, may also be imposed on perpetrators of illegal activities.
Unlike civil penalties, criminal penalties are not collected through the
assessment procedures but are imposed after conviction in criminal
proceedings.172 Although criminal fraud provisions often encompass the

166. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.04[2], at 50-12. See supra text
accompanying notes 140-48 (describing the failure to file penalty imposed by I.R.C. § 6651).
167. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.06, at 50-33. Tax fraud is an intentional
wrongdoing with the specific purpose of evading a tax owed, requiring both a tax due and owing and
fraudulent intent. I.R.S. IRM § 25.1.1.2 (2014), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25001-001.html#d0e119.
168. I.R.S. IRM § 25.1.6.3(1) (2016), available at https://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-001006.html
169. Id.
170. Id. § 25.1.6.3(2).
171. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.06, at 50-3435.
172. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 495 (1943). The government must bring an indictment
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same conduct as the civil fraud penalty,173 the government must prove
criminal fraud by the higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.174 In
any court proceeding involving the question of fraud with the intent to
evade taxes, the burden of proof with respect to fraud is on the
government.175 The elements of the various criminal penalties also may
overlap but all require the element of willfulness that is given the same
interpretation for all of the criminal penalties.176 Unlike the civil penalty,
the criminal provisions apply to more than just the taxpayer, allowing the
government to prosecute individuals aiding the taxpayer, including
employees, accountants, lawyers, and tax preparers.177
a. I.R.C. Section 7201—Attempt to Evade Tax
A taxpayer who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the
payment of any tax, in addition to other penalties provided by law,178 is
guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, will be fined not more than
$100,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, together with
the costs of prosecution.179 The Supreme Court described the criminal
fraud penalty:
[W]e consider this felony as the capstone of a system of sanctions
which singly or in combination were calculated to induce prompt

for a tax crime within three years after the commission of the offense. I.R.C. § 6531 (West 2017).
Except that the statute of limitations is extended to six years for criminal penalties the result of the
following activities: (1) offenses involving tax fraud; (2) willfully attempting to evade tax; (3) aiding or
assisting the preparation of a fraudulent tax return; (4) willfully failing to pay tax; and (5) fraudulent
and false statements and tax returns. § 6531.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 167-71 (discussing the elements of fraud and conduct
indicative of fraud).
174. Spies, 317 U.S. at 495. Imposition of a civil penalty after a criminal prosecution does not
constitute double jeopardy. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.06, at 50-36. A civil
penalty may be imposed after an acquittal in a criminal prosecution as the Service’s burden of proof in
the former is clear and convincing evidence and in the latter is beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 503637.
175. I.R.C. § 7454(a) (West 2017).
176. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 361 (1973).
177. 6 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 91, ¶ 114.9.1, at 114-8182. In the penalty chapter of the
Internal Revenue Code, the term “person” includes officers and employees of corporations and
members and employees of partnerships. I.R.C. § 7343 (West 2017); see also I.R.C. § 6694 (West
2017) (subjecting tax preparers to civil penalties for negligent or willful attempts to understate a client’s
tax liability); I.R.C. § 6701 (West 2017) (imposing civil penalties on persons who aid or abet the
understatement of another person’s tax liability); I.R.C. § 7206(2) (West 2017) (imposing criminal
penalties on persons who willfully aid or assist in the preparation of a tax return, affidavit, claim, or
other document that is fraudulent or false as any material matter).
178. The phrase “other penalties provided by law” includes the civil fraud penalty and other
statutory fines and prison terms if prosecution does not constitute double jeopardy. BITTKER,
MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6 ¶ 50.08[2], at 50-50. See supra text accompanying notes 161-66
(discussing the civil fraud penalty imposed by I.R.C. § 6663).
179. I.R.C. § 7201 (West 2017).
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and forthright fulfillment of every duty under the income tax
law . . ..180
The three elements required by I.R.C. section 7201 are: (1) willfulness; (2)
the existence of a tax deficiency; and (3) an affirmative act constituting an
evasion, or attempted evasion, of tax.181 With regard to the first
requirement, the Supreme Court found that the term “willfulness” requires
“a voluntary, intentional violation of a known duty.”182 Thus, willfulness
does not include a “frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made
despite the exercise of reasonable care.”183 For example, if the taxpayer,
who failed to file a tax return for three years, acted in good faith on his
belief that a tax return or payment of tax was not required because wages
were not income, the element of willfulness is not present no matter how
objectively unreasonable his belief.184 Willfulness can also be refuted by
the demonstration of a good faith reliance on a tax advisor if all relevant
facts were disclosed by the taxpayer.185 The element of willfulness can be
inferred from facts and circumstances such as evidence of a consistent
pattern of underreporting large amounts of income and the failure to
include all income in books and records.186
The second requirement is the existence of a tax deficiency.187 While
a formal deficiency assessment is prima facie evidence of a deficiency, the
taxpayer has the opportunity to prove that the assessment does not
accurately reflect the existence of a tax deficiency.188 The government
need not establish the exact dollar amount of tax owed, only the existence
of a substantial deficiency.189 Sufficient is the allegation that the taxpayer
knowingly and willfully attempted to evade income tax by the use of
fraudulent devices, “resulting in many thousands of dollars of taxable but
unreported income.”190
The third requirement is an affirmative act constituting an evasion, or
attempted evasion, of tax, which lifts the offense from a misdemeanor to a
felony.191 Congress did not define or limit methods by which a willful

180. Spies, 317 U.S. at 497.
181. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965).
182. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 360.
183. Spies, 317 U.S. at 496.
184. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991).
185. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.08[2], at 50-5253.
186. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954).
187. The requirement of a tax deficiency is surprising as the language of the statute seemingly
includes both successful and unsuccessful attempts to evade tax. 6 BORIS & LOKKEN, supra note 91, ¶
114.9.2, at 114-88; see id. (discussing the uncertainty as to whether and to what extent this prerequisite
to prosecution must be met).
188. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.08[2], at 50-54.
189. United States v. Bucker, 610 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir. 1979).
190. Id. at 574.
191. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497–98 (1943).
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evasion or attempted evasion of tax may be accomplished.192 Although the
mere failure to file a tax return does not constitute an affirmative act of
evasion,193 the requirement of an affirmative act of evasion or attempted
evasion of tax can be inferred from conduct, including
[K]eeping a double set of books, making false entries or
alterations, or false invoices or documents, destruction of
books or records, concealment of assets or covering up
sources of income, handling of one’s affairs to avoid
making the records usual in transactions of the kind, and
any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead
or to conceal.194
b. I.R.C. Section 7203—Willful Failure to File Return, Supply Information,
or Pay Tax
A willful failure to file a tax return, keep records, supply information,
or pay tax at the time required constitutes a misdemeanor subject to a fine
of not more than $25,000, or imprisonment of not more than one year, or
both, plus the costs of prosecution.195 Failure to file a return and pay tax, if
the taxpayer knows the tax is due, is a willful omission and, as such, a
misdemeanor.196 Tax evasion, however, must be proven by an affirmative
act, such as filing a false return.197 Even if a taxpayer intends to file at a
later date, a taxpayer that willfully fails to file will violate section 7203
because the required intent is the intentional disregard of a legal obligation,
and not the intent to defraud the government.198 A good faith belief that a
tax return is not required is a defense to the charge of willful failure to file
even if the belief is objectively unreasonable.199 Additionally, a good faith
belief that the filing of a tax return violates the taxpayer’s privilege against
self-incrimination is a defense to the charge of willful failure to file.200
c. I.R.C. Sections 7206 and 7207—Fraudulent and False Statements
Pursuant to I.R.C. section 7206, each of the following offenses
constitutes a felony, punishable with a fine of not more than $100,000, or

192. Id. at 499.
193. Id. at 49798.
194. Id. at 499. If tax evasion is a motive, the criminal fraud penalty may be imposed even though
such conduct may also conceal other crimes.
195. I.R.C. § 7203 (West 2017).
196. Spies, 317 at 493.
197. Id. at 494.
198. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 50.08[5], at 50-5758.
199. Id. at 50-58.
200. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 71-94 (discussing the application of the privilege
against self-incrimination).
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imprisonment of not more than three years, or both, plus the cost of
prosecution: (1) willfully making a false declaration under penalty of
perjury; (2) willfully aiding or assisting in the preparation of any return or
other document, which is fraudulent or false as to any material matter; (3)
willfully falsifying or fraudulently executing or signing any bond, permit,
entry, or other document required by the tax laws; (4) willfully removing,
depositing, or concealing property upon which tax is imposed, or levied,
with intent to evade or defeat the assessment or collection of any tax; and
(5) willfully concealing property or withholding, falsifying, or destroying
records, or making any false statement in connection any compromise or
closing agreement. A conviction under this section can be based on a
willful omission of a material fact as well as on an affirmative false
statement.201 Although the defect must be material, the government does
not have to prove that the Service relied on the false statement202 or that
there was a tax deficiency.203 Pursuant to I.R.C. section 7207, a willful
delivery or disclosure of fraudulent lists, records, accounts, statements, or
other document is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than
$10,000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. This section
overlaps with I.R.C. sections 7201 and 7206(1)204 but, unlike the latter,
I.R.C. section 7207, does not require the false statement to be made under
the penalty of perjury.205
The problem—epitomized by the crusader against organized crime
who would indict a person for spitting on the sidewalk if the suspect’s more
heinous crimes could not be established by sufficient evidence—is more
complex than ordinarily recognized.206
E. PRIORITY OF CLAIMS
If a criminal is proven to have undeclared illegal income, the
government’s claim for the taxes owed on the unreported income is often in
competition with the victim’s claim for restitution.207 Under the tax lien
provisions,208 the tax lien of the federal government may have priority over
the lien of the victim.209 Although the priority of federal tax liens was not
at issue in James,210 Justice Black, in his dissent, stated: “subjecting the

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

United States v. Tager, 479 F.2d 120, 122 (10th Cir. 1973).
United States v. Romanow, 509 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1975).
United States v. Jernigan, 411 F.2d 471, 473 (5th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 927 (1969).
Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349 (1965).
United States v. Levy, 533 F.2d 969, 974–75 (5th Cir. 1976).
6 BORIS & LAWRENCE, supra note 91, ¶ 114.9.1, at 114-80.
PAUL R. MCDANIEL, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., DANIEL L. SIMMONS & GREGG D. POLSKY,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 180 (Foundation Press 6th ed. 2008).
208. I.R.C. §§ 63206323 (West 2017).
209. MCDANIEL, MCMAHON, SIMMONS & POLSKY, supra note 207.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38 (discussing the Supreme Court’s opinion in James
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embezzled funds to a tax would amount to allowing the United States a
preferential claim for part of the dishonest gain, to the direct loss and
detriment of those to whom it ought to be restored.”211
If an individual fails to pay a tax liability after demand, I.R.C. section
6321 provides that the unpaid tax, including interest, penalties, and costs,
“shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to
property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.”212 A tax lien
takes effect retroactively as of the date of assessment and continues until
the tax liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable due to the lapse of
time.213 The Service must give the taxpayer notice of the assessment and
demand payment as soon as practicable and within sixty days after making
the assessment.214 The Service may levy on the taxpayer’s property if the
taxpayer neglects or fails to pay the tax within ten days after notice and
demand.215 In addition to the ten-day period, the Service must give notice
of its intention to levy at least thirty days before the levy is made.216
With regard to solvent taxpayers, the general rule is that “first in time”
determines the priority of liens.217 Generally, state law determines the legal
interest of the taxpayer in the property to which the tax lien can attach, and
federal law determines the priority of the competing liens asserted against
the taxpayer’s property or rights to property.218 Although valid against
some third parties, an unfiled tax lien is not effective against four classes of
claimants: purchasers, holders of security interests, mechanic’s lienors, and
judgement lien creditors.219 A tax lien does not attach to a purchaser of
property if the purchase is for “adequate and full consideration in money
that income from illegal activity is income despite the wrongdoer’s obligation to repay).
211. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 227 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
212. I.R.C. §§ 6321. An assessment is the determination of the amount of taxes due, and a lien
protects the government’s rights as a creditor. 6 BORIS & LOKKEN, supra note 91, ¶ 111.6.4, at 11115758.
213. § 6322. The government has ten years from the date of assessment to collect unpaid taxes
unless the ten-year period is suspended or extended by agreement. I.R.S. §§ 6502(a), 6503 (West
2017). Generally, a lien is a claim or charge on property for payment of debt; however, a transfer of
property to satisfy a debt can only be effective by levy or seizer. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶
14.04.
214. I.R.C. § 6303(a) (West 2017). Nevertheless, the Service’s failure give notice within sixty days
does not invalidate the notice. Treas. Reg. § 301.6303-1(a) (as amended in 2001).
215. I.R.C. § 6331(a) (2017). If the Service finds that collection is in jeopardy, the Service may give
notice and demand for immediate payment and levy upon the taxpayer’s property without regard to the
ten-day period. Id.
216. § 6331(d).
217. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954); SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶
16.01. See generally SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶¶ 16.07-16 (discussing the priority of tax
liens of insolvent debtors and debtors in bankruptcy).
218. Aguilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513–14 (1960); SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶
14.07[1][e].
219. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (West 2017). Even if filed, a tax lien is not valid against a class of
“superpriority” interests listed in Section 6323(b). See § 6334 (exempting certain categories of property
from levy).
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and money’s worth.”220 Thus, property subject to a bona fide sale prior to
the filing of the tax lien is protected as the taxpayer no longer owns the
property.221 The Service may not immediately record a tax lien because the
filing of a tax lien may adversely affect the taxpayer’s ability to pay.222
With regard to after acquired property, with few exceptions, a federal tax
lien is always first in time. 223 A claimant, who under state law would have
priority, may be subordinate to a subsequently filed tax lien if the
claimant’s lien is “inchoate,” or unperfected, prior to the filing of the tax
lien.224
It is well established that illegally obtained funds are includable in the
income of a wrongdoer.225 However, the question arises as to whether the
government can levy upon specific property acquired with illegally
obtained funds.226 In Dennis v. United States,227 the District Court found
that a federal tax lien does not attach to property held by the embezzler and
traceable to the victim.228 The threshold question addressed by the District
Court was the ownership of the property under state law as a tax lien only
extends to the property belonging to the wrongdoer.229 If under state law
the ownership of embezzled funds do not pass to the embezzler, the
government cannot levy upon property purchased with those funds.230
Applying common law principles, the District Court found that the victims
did not intend that the embezzler to acquire title to the property, therefore,
the levy by the Service was null and void.231
An important treatise on federal income tax presents the practical
application of the priority of claims involving criminal activity notes:
If a victim can trace and identify his property, as in the
case of a stolen work of art, he generally can get it back,
even if the thief has nothing left with which to pay his
taxes. Even if the property cannot be traced (e.g., cash

220. § 6223(h)(6); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-1(f) (as amended in 2011).
221. SALTZMAN & BOOK, supra note 75, ¶ 14.07[1][c].
222. Id. at ¶ 14.04.
223. Id. at ¶ 14.07[1][b].
224. United States v. Sec. Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 113–14 (1950). See supra text
accompanying notes 42-52 (finding by the Second Circuit, in Gilbert, that the corporation’s claim was
subordinate to the federal tax lien because the corporation failed to file the taxpayer’s assignment of
property).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 14-41 (describing the Supreme Court decisions resulting in
the inclusion in income of receipts from all types of illegal activity).
226. MCDANIEL, MCMAHON, SIMMONS & POLSKY, supra note 207, at 181.
227. Dennis v. United States, 372 F.Supp. 563 (1974).
228. Id. at 566–68.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. See Altas, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.Supp. 1000 (1978) (holding that the tax lien of the
government was not entitled to priority as the embezzler did not have beneficial ownership of the
property purchased with the embezzled funds).
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whose serial numbers are not known), the victim will
ordinarily be familiar with the facts sooner than the
government, and this prior knowledge will usually enable
him to establish an enforceable claim against any assets
that can be discovered in the criminal’s possession before
the government’s tax lien takes hold. Situations can be
imagined in which the victim’s right to reimbursement will
be subordinate to the government’s right to collect taxes on
the unlawful income, but they are unusual, and a corrective
for this injustice could be provided by Congress without
going so far as to confer a blanket exemption on unlawful
income.232
F. DEDUCTION OF EXPENSES, LOSSES, AND PAYMENTS
“We start with the proposition that the federal income tax is a tax on
net income, not a sanction against wrong-doing.”233 The determination of
the deductibility of expenses and losses incurred in an illegal activity
begins with classification of the activity.234 If the unlawful activity
constitutes a business, the wrongdoer may deduct all ordinary and
necessary business expenses235 and all losses incurred in the business.236
With regard to a nonbusiness, for-profit activity, a deduction is allowed for
all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the production of income237
and all losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit. However,
no deduction or credit is allowed for any amount paid if the business
consists of trafficking in controlled substances prohibited by federal or
state law.238
1. Deduction of Expenses Pursuant to I.R.C. Sections 162 and 212
In 1969, I.R.C. section 162, which allows a deduction for all ordinary
and necessary business expenses, was amended to disallow deductions for
specific categories of payments.239 The amendments were necessary to
provide clarity as to the deductibility of such payments as illegal payments

232. Bittker, supra note 88, at 147.
233. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 691 (1966).
234. See Sullivan v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 27 (1958) (allowing a deduction for rents and salaries
paid in an illegal gambling enterprise as ordinary and necessary business expenses).
235. I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2017).
236. I.R.C. § 165(c)(1) (West 2017).
237. I.R.C. § 212(1)-(2) (West 2017). In addition, Section 212 allows a deduction for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income and expenses
incurred in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax. § 212(2)-(3).
238. § 280E.
239. Tax Reform Act of 1960, Pub. L. 91-172.
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and bribes.240 The conflict was between the requirement of taxing only net
income and the frustration of the public policy against encouraging
unlawful conduct.241 Pursuant to the Frustration of Public Policy Doctrine,
a deduction is disallowed if a deduction would “frustrate sharply defined
national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct.”242 The
disallowance of a deduction requires a declared national or state policy and
severe and immediate frustration of that policy.243
By amending I.R.C. section 162, Congress preempted the existing
case law establishing the Frustration of Public Policy Doctrine, stating
“public policy, in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly
defined to justify disallowance of deductions.”244 Certain deductions
disallowed for specific categories of payments are also disallowed for
payments incurred for the production of income under I.R.C. section 212.245
a. I.R.C. Section 162(c)—Illegal Bribes, Kickbacks, and Other Payments
Pursuant to I.R.C. 162(c)(1), no deduction is allowed for direct or
indirect payments to any governmental official or employee, or any agency
or instrumentality of any government, if the payment is an illegal bribe or
kickback.246 I.R.C. section 162(c)(2) disallows a deduction for direct or
indirect payments to any person if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe,
illegal kickback under any federal or state law, which subjects the payor to
a criminal penalty or the loss of license or privilege to engage in a trade or
business.247 If a violation of state law, the deduction is only disallowed if

240. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 11.04[1], at 11-34.
241. Id. Arguably, the denial of a deduction for expenditures incurred in the production of illegal
income could be viewed as the functional equivalent of the imposition of a tax penalty. MCDANIEL,
MCMAHON, SIMMONS & POLSKY, supra note 207, at 399 .
242. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966).
243. Id.
244. S. REP. NO. 91-552 (1969) as reprinted in 1969-3 C.B. 423, 597; BITTKER, MCMAHON &
ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 11.04[1], at 11-34. Under I.R.C. § 162, deductions are also disallowed for
certain lobbying and political expenditures (§ 162(e)) and treble-damage payments under the antitrust
laws (§ 162(g)).
245. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(p) (as amended in 1975). Pursuant to Section 212 of the Internal
Revenue Code, a deduction will not be allowed if the payment is incurred for the following: (1)
illegal bribes, kickbacks, and other payments § 162(c)); (2) fines and penalties (Section 162(f)); and
(3) treble damage payments under the antitrust laws (Section 162(g)). See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(p).
246. If an official or employee of a foreign government, a payment cannot be deducted if unlawful
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. I.R.C. § 162(c)(1) (West 2017). The government
must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the payment is an illegal bribe or kickback or
unlawful under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. §§ 162(c)(1), 7454; see also Treas. Reg. §
1.162-18(a)(5) (as amended in 1975).
247. The government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the payment is an illegal
bribe or kickback. I.R.C. §§ 162(c)(2), 7454; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162-18(b)(4) (as amended in
1975).
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the state law is generally enforced.248 A kickback also includes a payment
in consideration of the referral of a client, patient, or customer.249 Finally, a
deduction is disallowed, pursuant to I.R.C. section 162(c)(3), for kickbacks,
rebates, or bribes by physicians and other providers of goods and services
in connection with Medicare or Medicaid, including payments for referrals
of clients, patients, or customers.
b. I.R.C. Section 162(f)—Fines and Penalties
A deduction is not allowed for “any fine or similar penalty paid to a
government for the violation of any law.”250 The disallowance occurs
whether the violation was deliberate or inadvertent.251 The term “similar
penalty” encompasses “payments of sanctions which are imposed under
civil statutes but which in general terms serve the same purpose as a fine
exacted under a criminal statute.”252 Pursuant to the Treasury Regulations,
a fine or similar payment includes the following: (1) paid pursuant to
conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for a crime (felony or
misdemeanor); (2) paid as a civil penalty imposed by federal, state or local
law, including additions to tax, additional amount, or assessable penalties
imposed under the Internal Revenue Code; (3) paid in settlement of an
actual or potential liability for a fine or penalty (federal or civil); or (4)
forfeited as collateral posted in connection with a proceeding which could
result in imposition of a fine or penalty.253 A fine or penalty does not
include the following: (1) legal fees and related expenses made in defense
of a prosecution or civil action arising from violation of the law; or (2)
compensatory damages paid to a government.254
2. Deduction of Losses Pursuant to I.R.C. Section 165
I.R.C. section 165 allows a deduction for a loss sustained during the
tax year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise.255 In the case of
an individual, the deduction is limited to: (1) losses incurred in a
business;256 (2) losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit;257

248. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2).
249. § 162(c)(2).
250. § 162(f).
251. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 11.04[2], at 11-36.
252. S. REP. NO. 92-437, reprinted in 1972-1 C.B. 559, 600; BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK,
supra note 6, ¶ 11.04[2], at 11-36.
253. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(1) (as amended in 1975).
254. Id. at § 1.162-21(b)(2).
255. I.R.C. § 165(a) (West 2017). The deduction is allowed only to the extent of the taxpayer’s
basis in the property. § 165(b).
256. § 165(c)(1).
257. § 165(c)(2).
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and (3) with regard to personal use property, casualty and theft losses
sustained during the tax year.258
In 1969, I.R.C. section 162 was amended to disallow deductions for
specific categories of otherwise ordinary and necessary business
expenses.259 The legislative intent was to preempt the long-established
Frustration of Public Policy Doctrine.260 Nevertheless, the Service has long
maintained that the Frustration of Public Policy Doctrine applies to the
allowability of loss deductions pursuant to I.R.C. section 165.261 In
Revenue Ruling 81-24,262 the taxpayer set fire to a building to collect
insurance proceeds.263 After the arson was discovered, the insurance
proceeds were not paid and the taxpayer was convicted of arson.264 On his
tax return, the taxpayer claimed a casualty loss deduction in the amount he
paid for the building.265 Since the taxpayer’s knowing and willful act
caused the loss, the loss did not qualify as a casualty pursuant to I.R.C.
section 165(c)(3).266 Further, because the taxpayer violated the applicable
state law against committing arson and making a fraudulent insurance
claim, a loss deduction pursuant to I.R.C. section 165(c)(1) or (c)(2) was
disallowed on the grounds that a loss deduction would violate a sharply
defined state declaration of public policy.267 The Service also stated that a
deduction was not allowed pursuant to I.R.C. sections 162 and 212 as the
taxpayer sustained a theft loss and not an ordinary and necessary expense
incurred in a business or a for-profit activity.268
3. Deduction of Legal Expenses
For taxpayers engaged in criminal conduct, the ability to deduct legal
fees is of considerable importance. Costs incurred in defending criminal
charges are deductible if incurred in a business or a for-profit activity, but
258. § 165(c)(3). See infra text accompanying notes 338–60 (explaining the allowability of, and
limitations on, deductions for the casualty and theft of personal-use property).
259. I.R.C. § 162(c), (f), (g) (West 2017).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 239-44 (discussing the Frustration of Public Policy
Doctrine and the amendments to I.R.C. section 162 that preempted the Frustration of Public Policy
Doctrine).
261. See BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 16.01, at 16-4 n..8; see also Rev. Rul.
77-126, 1977-1 C.B. 47 (disallowing a loss deduction for the seizer of illegal coin-operated gambling
devices as contrary to a sharply defined public policy); Mazzei v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 497 (1974)
(denying a theft loss claimed by the taxpayer because the taxpayer was defrauded while participating in
a counterfeiting conspiracy and the allowance of the deduction would constitute an immediate and
severe frustration of the clearly defined policy against counterfeiting U.S. currency).
262. Rev. Rul. 81-24, 1981-1 C.B. 79.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 7980.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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not a personal activity.269 In deciding whether legal fees are personal, the
Supreme Court established the origin-of-the-claim test.270 The origin and
character of the claim with respect to legal expenses determines
deductibility and not the potential financial consequences to the taxpayer.271
Although a deduction for expenses incurred in an illegal activity might
otherwise be disallowed, the disallowance does not extend to legal fees
incurred in defense of prosecution or legal action if incurred in business or
a for-profit activity.272 In Commissioner v. Tellier,273 the Supreme Court
held that legal expenses incurred by a taxpayer in the unsuccessful defense
of a criminal prosecution for securities and mail fraud were deductible as
business expenses.274 The Supreme Court found that the criminal charges
against the taxpayer were the result of his business activities as a security
dealer.275 In DiFronzo v. Commissioner,276 the taxpayer was a member of a
Chicago organized crime family, who incurred legal fees in defending
conspiracy and mail and wire fraud charges from his involvement in an
illegal gambling operation.277 The Tax Court allowed a business deduction
for his legal fees because the criminal charges originated from his business
activities as a member of an organized crime family.278 The crime family
obtained income through a variety of illegal activities, including
bookmaking, loan sharking, extortion, illegal gambling, trafficking in
stolen property, and fraud.279
4. Deduction of Payments in Restitution
In Wilcox, the Supreme Court held that funds were not included in
income because the embezzler did not have an unqualified right to the
funds and had an unconditional obligation to repay.280 The Supreme Court,
in James, overruled the Wilcox decision, holding that embezzled funds are
269. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 11.02[2][i], at 11-25. No deduction is
allowed for “personal, living, or family expenses.” I.R.C. § 262(a) (West 2017).
270. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963). In Gilmore, the Supreme Court held that
attorney fees incurred by a husband successfully protecting assets from the claims of his wife in a
divorce proceeding are nondeductible personal expenses. Id. at 52. See also United States v. Patrick,
372 U.S. 53 (1963) (holding that a husband could not deduct legal expenses incurred in negotiating a
property settlement incident to a divorce proceeding).
271. Gilmore, 372 U.S. at 49.
272. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-21(b)(2) (as amended in 1975); 1.212-1(p) (as amended in 1975).
273. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
274. Id. at 695 (1966). The Supreme Court found that the legal expenses were “ordinary” (not
capital expenditures) and “necessary” (appropriate and helpful). Id. at 689–90.
275. Id. at 695.
276. DiFronzo v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 1998-41 (1998).
277. Id. at 1998-41, 2.
278. Id. at 1998-41, 4.
279. Id. at 1998-41, 2.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24 (discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court in
Wilcox).
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included in the income of the embezzler despite the legal obligation of the
embezzler to make restitution.281 The Supreme Court noted that if the
embezzler makes restitution to the victim, the embezzler could deduct the
amount paid in the tax year of the repayment:282
Just as the honest taxpayer may deduct any amount repaid in the year
in which repayment is made, the Government points out that, “if, when,
and to the extent that the victim recovers back the misappropriated funds,
there is of course a reduction in the embezzler’s income.283
The taxpayer, in Stephens v. Commissioner,284 participated in a
scheme by employees to defraud and embezzle funds from their employer
(Raytheon).285 The taxpayer was convicted of various federal crimes for
which the trial judge imposed a $16,000 fine and sentenced the taxpayer to
multiple terms of imprisonment.286 The sentencing judge suspended one of
the prison terms, substituting five years of probation, on the condition the
taxpayer make restitution to Raytheon in the amount of $1,000,000
($530,000 principal and $470,000 interest).287 The taxpayer included the
embezzled funds into income and sought to deduct the $530,000 payment
in restitution.288 The Tax Court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to a
loss deduction, under I.R.C. section 165(c)(2),289 on the ground that
allowance of the deduction would frustrate public policy.290
On appeal, the Second Circuit found that the loss deduction would not
“severely and immediately frustrate sharply defined state or national public
policy.”291 In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit considered both the
compensatory nature and the tax consequences of the payment.292 The
Second Circuit determined that the restitution payment was primarily
remedial in nature to compensate Raytheon and not a fine or penalty, even

281. See supra text accompanying notes 31–38 (discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court in
James).
282. See supra text accompanying notes 31–38 (discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court in
James). Forfeiture (payment to the government as a punitive measure) and restitution (repayment to the
victim of a crime) must be distinguished because payments of forfeitures are nondeductible and
payments of restitution may be deductible. Brackney, supra note 161.
283. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 220 (1961).
284. Stephens v. Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (1990). See Robert T. Manicke, A Tax Deduction for
Restitution Payments? Solving the Dilemma of the Thwarted Embezzler, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 593
(1992) (arguing that a deduction should be allowed for payments of restitution in the interest of taxing
only net income and the separation of the tax laws from the punitive functions of the government).
285. Stephens, 905 F.2d at 668.
286. Id. at 671.
287. Id. at 668.
288. Id. at 66869.
289. Section 165(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code allows an individual a loss deduction for
transactions entered into for profit.
290. Stephens, 905 F.2d at 669. See supra text accompanying notes 239-45 and 260-68 (discussing
the Frustration of Public Policy Doctrine as it applies to Sections 162, 212, and 165).
291. Stephens, 905 F.2d at 670.
292. Id. at 67274.
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though the taxpayer repaid the embezzled funds as a condition of his
probation.293 The fact that the taxpayer’s sentence consisted of a prison
term, fines, and an order to make restitution supported the inference that
the restitution payment was compensatory in nature and not in the nature of
a fine or penalty.294 In addition, if the deduction was disallowed, the
Second Circuit reasoned that, because the he had already paid tax on the
embezzled funds, the taxpayer would be paying tax on income that he did
not retain.295
I.R.C. section 1341 provides relief from the application of different
tax rates in the computation of tax where a taxpayer included income under
a claim of right and was allowed a deduction in a subsequent tax year
because the taxpayer was required to repay the amount previously
included.296 The amount included in the earlier year must have been
included under a claim of right, meaning it appeared from all available
facts that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to the income.297 The tax
liability for the tax year of repayment is the lesser of: (1) the tax for the tax
year with the deduction; or (2) the tax computed without the deduction
minus the decrease in tax liability for the earlier tax year if the amount
repaid had not been included in income.298 The ability to utilize this
provision is particularly important if the taxpayer is in a lower marginal
rate of tax in the tax year of restitution.299
To utilize I.R.C. section 1341, the taxpayer must have an apparent
unrestricted right to the income in the tax year of inclusion.300 In Yerkie v.
Commissioner,301 an embezzler argued that the Supreme Court, in James,302
expanded the Claim of Right Doctrine to include embezzled funds.303 The
Tax Court held that the taxpayer could not utilize I.R.C. section 1341 in
computing his tax liability in the year of repayment because the embezzled
funds were not received under a claim of right.304 Noting the underlying
purpose of the Supreme Court in the James decision was to avoid taxing
legal income while exempting illegal income, the Tax Court found that
distinction between legal and illegal income is significant for

293. Id. at 67374.
294. Id. at 673.
295. Id. at 671.
296. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1), (2) (West 2017). The amount of the deduction must exceed $3,000. §
1341(a)(3).
297. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1996).
298. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(4), (5).
299. See BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 4.03[4].
300. I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1).
301. Yerkie v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 388 (1976).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38 (discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court in
James).
303. Yerkie, 67 T.C. at 391.
304. Id.
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determinations under other sections of the Internal Revenue Code.305 The
taxpayer misconstrued the meaning of term “unrestricted right” for the
purposes of I.R.C. section 1341, stating: “The inclusion of embezzled funds
as gross income and the concomitant right to a deduction upon repayment
neither categorizes proceeds as income rightfully received nor bestows
upon these funds the characteristics of income received under a claim of
right.”306
5. Treatment of Non-Business Deductions
The distinction between criminal activity that constitutes a business
and criminal activity that is engaged in for profit is important in the
computation of the wrongdoer’s taxable income. Business deductions are
fully deductible from gross income in computing the adjusted gross income
of an individual;307 however, most for-profit deductions are itemized
deductions subject to limitations.308 Thus, a pivotal question is whether the
wrongdoer’s illegal activities constitute a business.
In Commissioner v. Groetzinger,309 the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a full-time gambler who made wagers solely for his own
account was engaged in business within the meaning of I.R.C. sections
62(a)(1) and 162.310 The taxpayer devoted sixty to eighty hours per week
to pari-mutuel wagering, primarily on dog races, with intent to earn a living
from such activities.311 The taxpayer gambled solely for his own account
and had no other employment.312 The Supreme Court observed that not
every income-producing and profit-making activity constitutes a
business.313 To be engaged in a business, the “taxpayer must be involved in
the activity with continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer’s primary
purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit.”314
Applying a common sense concept of business,315 the Supreme Court

305. Id. at 392.
306. Id.
307. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (West 2017).
308. I.R.C. § 63(d) (West 2017). The term “itemized deduction” means all deductions except
those deductions allowed in computing adjusted gross income under Section 62 and personal
exemptions under Sections 151-52. An individual may deduct a standard deduction or elect to
itemize deductions. § 63 (b), (c).
309. Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
310. Id. at 24. Section 62(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code allows an individual to deduct
business expenses, other than the business of the performing services as an employee, from gross
income in arriving at adjusted gross income. With exceptions, Section 162 allows a deduction for
ordinary and necessary business expenses.
311. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 24.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 35.
314. Id.
315. Id.

MANOLAKAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

64

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

2/9/2017 3:46 PM

[Vol. 13:1

concluded, based on the particular facts of this case, that “if one’s gambling
activity is pursued full-time, in good faith, and with regularity, to the
production of income for a livelihood, and is not a mere hobby, it is a trade
or business.”316
An example with regard to criminal activity, the courts and the
Service agree that embezzlement does not constitute a business even
though the embezzlements are regular and systematic.317 Thus, an
embezzler must deduct any expense incurred for the production and
conservation of income under I.R.C. section 212318 and any loss incurred in
a transaction entered into for profit under I.R.C. section 165(c)(2).319 If
restitution is made, the embezzler is allowed a deduction for restitution
payments under I.R.C. section 165(c)(2).320 These deductions are itemized
deduction and, as such, deducted from an individuals adjusted gross
income in computing taxable income.321
Deductions allowed pursuant to I.R.C. sections 212 and 165(c)(2)
are also included in the definition of “miscellaneous itemized
deductions.”322 Miscellaneous itemized deductions are only allowed to
the extent total miscellaneous itemized deductions exceed two percent
of the embezzler’s adjusted gross income for the tax year.323 If the
embezzler’s adjusted gross income exceeds a threshold amount, the
allowable itemized deductions are subject to a further limitation.324
Thus, deductions allowed to embezzlers for for-profit expenses and
restitution are subject to the two percent of adjusted gross income
limitation and the overall limitation on itemized deductions.325 Finally,
miscellaneous itemized deductions are not deductible for alternative
minimum tax purposes326 and non-business deductions are not included

316. Id. at 35.
317. See Yerkie v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 388, 393 (1976); see also Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B.
50; Hankins v. United States, 403 F.Supp. 257, 259 (1975) (holding that embezzlement is not a business
even though the taxpayers embezzled his employer’s funds in a regular and systemic manner).
318. I.R.C. § 212(1), (2) (West 2017).
319. § 165(c)(2).
320. Yerkie, 67 T.C. at 393–94; Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50.
321. I.R.C. § 63(a), (d) (West 2017); see also Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50.
322. I.R.C. § 67(b) (West 2017). The definition of “miscellaneous itemized deduction” includes
itemized deductions other than certain listed deductions, including deductions for interest, taxes,
casualty and theft losses, charitable contributions, and medical expenses. § 67(b)(1)–(5).
323. § 67(a).
324. I.R.C. § 68(a) (West 2017). The allowable itemized deductions are further reduced by the
lesser of: (1) three percent of the excess, or (2) 80 percent of the otherwise allowable itemized
deductions. Id.
325. See §§ 67, 68; see also Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50.
326. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 2017); see also I.R.C. §§ 55–57 (establishing an alternative tax,
which is a separate system for computing income tax liability; Rev. Rul. 65-254, 1965-2 C.B. 50
(holding that the repayment of misappropriated funds is deductible pursuant to Section 165(a)(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code; therefore, a miscellaneous itemized a deduction is not allowed for the purposes
of computing alternative minimum tax income).
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for the purposes of computing a net operating loss.327
III. VICTIMS
Victims of crime do not fare much better than the perpetrators of
crime.328 For tax purposes, the victims of thefts are generally treated
similarly to the victims of casualty events. Whether the taxpayer is
engaged in a business, for-profit activity, or personal pursuit, a casualty or
theft may result in a deductible loss. Although counterintuitive, the
casualty or theft of property may result in the realization and recognition of
gain.
A. LOSS FROM THEFT
A theft results in the taxpayer suffering a loss of money or property.
If a loss occurs, the question becomes whether the loss is a deductible loss
and, if so, in which tax year is the deduction allowed.
Generally, I.R.C. section 165 allows a loss deduction for any loss
sustained during the tax year and not compensated by insurance or
otherwise.329 A loss deduction is only allowed for the tax year in which the
loss is sustained as evidenced by closed and completed transactions and as
fixed by identifiable events.330 A theft loss is treated as sustained in the tax
year in which the theft is discovered331 and is considered discovered when a
reasonable person in similar circumstances would have realized the loss.332
If a claim for reimbursement exists in the tax year of discovery, a loss
is not sustained until determined with reasonable certainty whether or not
reimbursement will be received.333 If a portion of the loss is covered by a
claim for reimbursement only that portion of the loss is deductible during
the tax year.334 For example, if a solvent embezzler promises restitution, a
current loss deduction may be denied because the debt obligation
constitutes a reasonable prospect of recovery.335 If the debt is subsequently

327. Yerkie v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 388, 392–93 (1976); Hankins, v. United States, 403 F.Supp.
257, 259. See infra text accompanying notes 379-88 (detailing the computation of a net operating loss
under I.R.C. § 172).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 207-32 (discussing the priority of federal tax liens over the
claims of victims of crime for restitution).
329. I.R.C. § 165(a) (West 2017).
330. § 165(a); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.165–1(d)(1) (as amended in 1977).
331. I.R.C. § 165(e) (West 2017).
332. Cramer v. Comm’r, 55 T.C. 1125, 1133 (1971).
333. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165–1(d)(2)(as amended in 1977), 1.165–8(a)(2) (as amended in 1964).
Reasonable certainly maybe ascertained by the settlement, adjudication, or abandonment of a claim. §§
1.165–1(d)(2)(i), 1.165–8(a)(2).
334. §§ 1.165–1(d)(2)(ii), 1.165–8(a)(2).
335. MCDANIEL, MCMAHON, SIMMONS & POLSKY, supra note 207, at 530.
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not paid, a bad debt deduction may be allowed under I.R.C. section 166.336
Under I.R.C. section 165(c)(1) and (2), a loss deduction for an
individual is limited to loss incurred in a business or any transaction
entered into for profit.337 I.R.C. section 165(c)(3) limits losses involving
personal-use assets to losses arising from “fire, storm, shipwreck, or other
casualty, or from theft.”338 The term “casualty” is defined as an accident,
mishap, or sudden invasion by a hostile agency, excluding progressive
deterioration of property through a steadily operating cause.339 Analogous
to fire, storm, or shipwreck, a casualty requires a complete or partial
destruction of property resulting from an identifiable event of a sudden,
unexpected, and unusual nature.340
As originally enacted in 1913, the predecessor to I.R.C. section
165(c)(3) only referred only to a fire, storm, or shipwreck, but the provision
was amended in 1916 to include loss from “other casualty, or from
theft.”341 A theft is the unlawful taking of money or property of another,
including, but not limited to, theft by swindle, false pretenses, larceny,
The Fifth Circuit, in Edwards v.
embezzlement, and robbery.342
Bromberg,343 found that “the word ‘theft’ is not like ‘larceny,’ a technical
word of art with a narrowly defined meaning but is, on the contrary, a word
of general and broad connotation, intended to cover any criminal
appropriation of another’s property to the use of the taker, particularly
including theft by swindling, false pretenses, and any other form of
guile.”344 The Fifth Circuit also stated that courts have well established that
whether a theft occurs, “depends upon the law of the jurisdiction where it
was sustained and that the exact nature of the crime, whether larceny or
embezzlement, of obtaining money under false pretenses, swindling or
other wrongful deprivations of the property of another, is of little
importance so long as it amounts to theft.”345
To claim a theft loss, the victim must establish that the loss of money
or property resulted from theft under the law of the jurisdiction where the
loss occurred.346 In Revenue Ruling 72-112,347 the Service addressed the
336. Id. See I.R.C. § 166 (West 2017) (allowing a deduction for any debt that becomes wholly or
partially worthless during the tax year). Losses and bad debts are mutually exclusive. Spring City
Foundry v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934).
337. I.R.C. § 165(c)(1), (2).
338. § 165(c)(3).
339. Rev. Rul. 63–232, 1963-2 C.B. 97.
340. Rev. Rul. 72–592, 1972-2 C.B. 101.
341. 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 1, ¶ 34.3, at 34-15.
342. Treas. Reg. § 1.165–8(d) (as amended in 1964). Embezzlement constitutes a theft whether or
not connected with the taxpayer’s business or for-profit activity. Miller v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 1046
(1953).
343. Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 110.
346. Monteleone v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 688, 692 (1960). The alleged perpetrator of the theft
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issue of whether ransom paid to the kidnappers of a child was deductible as
a theft loss even though the laws of the state where the kidnapping occurred
distinguished the crimes of extortion and theft.348 The Service stated:
“[c]onsidering the broad general meaning of theft, it must be presumed that
Congress used the term ‘theft’ so as to cover any theft, or felonious taking
of money or property by which a taxpayer sustains a loss, whether defined
and punishable under the penal codes of the states as larceny, robbery,
burglary, embezzlement, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, threats, or
blackmail.”349 Thus, despite the fact that the ransom payments did not
constitute “theft” under state law, the ransom paid was deductible as a theft
loss because the taking of taxpayer’s money was illegal under the laws of
the state where the kidnapping occurred and the taking was done with
criminal intent.350
Notice 2004-27 was issued to inform taxpayers that a loss deduction
equal to the decline in market value of stock is not allowed even though the
decline may have been caused by fraudulent accounting practices or illegal
misconduct of corporate officers.351 To claim a theft loss, the taxpayer
must prove that a loss resulted from a taking of property that is illegal and
done with criminal intent.352 The taxpayer must also prove that a loss was
sustained, and a loss is not sustained if the stock merely declines in
value.353 In cases involving stock purchased on the open market, courts
have consistently disallowed a theft loss for the decline in value of stock in
circumstances in which the decline was attributable to misrepresentations
by corporate officers who were indicted for securities fraud or other
criminal violations.354 A loss deduction is allowed only in the tax year the
loss is sustained as a result of the sale or exchange of the stock or the stock
becoming completely worthless.355
No loss deduction is allowed for the mere mysterious disappearance of
property absent evidence of a theft.356 The taxpayer has the burden of
presenting evidence establishing a reasonable inference that the loss was
the result of a theft.357 For example, in Mary Frances Allen v.
need not be convicted of the crime. Vietzke v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.504, 510 (1961).
347. Rev. Rul. 72–112, 1972-1 C.B. 60.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 61.
350. Id.
351. I.R.S. Notice 2004-27, 2004-1 C.B. 782. With the facts as presented, the purpose of the notice
is to advise taxpayers that the loss deduction will be disallowed and penalties under Section 6662 of the
Internal Revenue Code may be imposed. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. The decline in value is viewed as a fluctuation in market value of the stock.
354. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 510-28 (discussing the tax treatment of theft losses from
fraudulent investment schemes that are not Ponzi schemes).
355. Id.
356. Mary Frances Allen v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 163, 166 (1951).
357. Id.
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Commissioner,358 the taxpayer’s diamond brooch was lost while visiting the
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York.359 The Tax Court held that the
burden of proof was on the taxpayer to prove that the brooch was stolen.
The taxpayer was denied a loss deduction because all she could prove was
that the brooch disappeared and was never found or returned. Although a
loss deduction is not allowed for the mere mysterious disappearance of
property, a loss deduction is allowed for property accidently and
irretrievably lost as the result of a casualty event.360
1. Loss from the Theft of Property
If property is the subject of a casualty or theft, the amount of the loss
deduction is limited to the unrecovered basis of any property involved.361
The formula for computing the amount of the casualty or theft loss is the
lesser of the reduction in value of the property or the basis of the
property.362 With regard to a theft loss, the value of the property after the
theft is considered zero.363
If an individual incurs a casualty or theft of property in a business or
for-profit activity, the amount of the loss deduction is only subject to the
basis limitation.364 With regard to personal-use property, the amount of
deductible casualty and theft loss is subject to the basis limitation and two
additional limitations.365 First, a loss deduction is allowed only to the
extent the amount of the loss from each casualty or theft exceeds $100.366
Second, the amount of the casualty or theft loss is limited to the sum of
personal casualty gain, plus the amount of any excess personal casualty
loss that exceeds ten percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.367

358. Id. at 163.
359. Id. at 16364.
360. White v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 430, 438 (1967); Rev. Rul. 72–592, 19722 C.B. 101.
361. I.R.C. § 165(b) (West 2017); Treas. Reg. § 1.165–1(c)(1) (as amended in 1977).
362. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165–7(b)(1) (as amended in 1977), 1.165–8(c) (as amended in 1964).
However, if property that is used in a business or transaction entered into for profit is totally destroyed,
and the basis of the property is greater than the value immediately before the casualty or theft, the
amount of the loss is the basis of the property. §§ 1.165–7(b)(1), 1.165–8(c). Two methods can be
employed to determine the reduction in value of property: (1) the appraised value of the property
immediately before and immediately after the event; or (2) the cost of repairs to the property. § 1.165–
7(a)(2).
363. Treas. Reg. § 1.165–8(c) (as amended in 1964).
364. I.R.C. § 165(b). See Rev. Rul. 87–59, 1987-2 C.B. 59 (holding that a business loss deduction
is allowed even though the casualty event lacked the requisite suddenness to qualify as a casualty).
365. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), (h).
366. §165(h)(1) (West 2017); Treas. Reg. § 1.165–7(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 1977). The $100
limitation applies separately to each individual who sustains a loss if the damaged or destroyed property
is owned by two or more individuals. § 1.165–7(b)(4)(iii).
367. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(B). The terms “personal casualty losses” and “personal casualty gains” are
defined as losses and gains arising from the casualty or theft of personal-use property. § 165(h)(4). If
the taxpayer’s personal-use property is insured, a casualty or theft loss deduction is only allowed if the
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Example: Taxpayer enjoys collecting art for personal enjoyment.
Taxpayer’s adjusted gross income is $100,000. During the tax year, a
sculpture was stolen from Taxpayer’s home. The sculpture was
purchased for $20,000 and had a value of $25,000. The sculpture was
uninsured and never recovered. During the same burglary, a painting
was also stolen. The painting was purchased for $10,000 and had a
value of $20,000, and Taxpayer received $15,000 in insurance
proceeds. As a result of the burglary, Taxpayer experienced a personal
casualty loss with regard to the sculpture of $19,900 (lesser of
reduction in value of $25,000 ($25,000 minus zero) or $20,000
($20,000 basis) minus the $100 floor) and a personal casualty gain of
$5,000 ($15,000 insurance proceeds minus $10,000 basis). Thus,
pursuant to I.R.C. section 165(h), Taxpayer’s allowable personal
casualty loss deduction is $9,900 ($5,000 to the extent of the personal
casualty gain plus $4,900 ($14,900 minus $10,000 ($100,000 adjusted
gross income x 10%)).
2. Tax Benefit Rule
As a taxpayer’s tax liability is based on the facts occurring within the
tax year, the good faith deduction of payments or losses that are recovered
in a subsequent tax year results in the inclusion into income of the amount
recovered under the Tax Benefit Rule.368 Thus, if a victim of theft properly
claims a loss deduction or a bad debt deduction and subsequently recovers
all or a portion of the amount deducted, the taxpayer must include in
income the amount recovered in the subsequent tax year.369 The amount
included is subject to I.R.C. section 111 that requires the earlier deduction
produced a tax benefit for the taxpayer.370
In Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States,371 the taxpayer
claimed a deduction for the value of parcels of real property donated to a
charity in 1939 and 1940.372 In 1957, the charity reconveyed the parcels to
the taxpayer.373 Pursuant to the Tax Benefit Rule, the taxpayer was
required to include in gross income the amount of the deductions taken in

taxpayer files a timely insurance claim. § 165(h)(5)(E).
368. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 3.07[1], at 3-2223 (Warren Gorham &
Lamont 3d ed. 2002). The Supreme Court has held that “a fundamentally inconsistent event,” and not
just an actual recovery, is necessary for the application of the Tax Benefit Rule. Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v.
Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983).
369. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.165–1(d)(2)(iii) (as amended in 1977), 1.166–1(f) (as amended in 1986).
370. I.R.C. § 111(a) (West 2017).
371. Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (1967).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 400.
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the prior tax years.374 In 1939 and 1940, the taxpayer’s tax rates were
eighteen and twenty-four percent, respectively, with the result that the
deductions produced a combined tax savings of $1,877.49.375 The
taxpayer’s tax rate in 1957 was fifty-two percent with the result that the
inclusion produced a tax cost of $4,527.60.376 The taxpayer argued that the
increase in tax liability for 1957 should be limited to the original tax benefit
of $1,877.49.377 The U.S. Court of Claims held:
Since the taxpayer in this case did obtain full tax benefit
from its earlier deductions, those deductions were properly
classified as income upon recoupment and must be taxed
as such. This can mean nothing less than the application of
that rate which is in effect during the year in which the
recovered item is recognized as a factor of income.378
3. Net Operating Loss
Congress enacted I.R.C. section 172 to ameliorate the effect of the
annual accounting period that requires a taxpayer’s taxable income to be
computed on the basis of the taxpayer’s tax year.379 The primary purpose
of this provision is to treat businesses with fluctuating income in the same
manner as businesses with a steady flow of income by allowing a net
operating loss to be carried back and then carried forward.380 The result is a
type of income averaging for the taxpayer experiencing business losses in
some years and business profits in other years.381 Generally, a net
operating loss (NOL) can be carried back and deducted against taxable
income in the two tax years prior to the loss year.382 Then, the NOL is
carried forward and deducted against taxable income for up to twenty tax
years subsequent to the loss year.383
374. Id. at 402.
375. Id. at 400.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 403. See supra text accompanying notes 296-306 (discussing the Claim of Right
Doctrine and I.R.C. Section 1341 that mitigates the difference in tax rate between the tax year of
inclusion and the tax year of deduction).
379. I.R.C. § 441(a); BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 19.02[1], at 19-6.
I.R.C. § 441(a) (West 2017); BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, ¶ 19.02[1] (Warren Gorham & Lamont 3d ed. 2002).
380. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 19.02[1], at 19-6.
381. Id.
382. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(A) (West 2017).
383. § 172(b)(1)(A). The entire net operating loss deduction must be carried first to the earliest
permissible year, and the remaining net operating loss deduction is then carried forward to each year in
a chronological order until the net operating loss is fully absorbed. § 172(b)(2). If a taxpayer carries a
net operating loss deduction to an earlier year, the deduction will require a recomputation of the tax
liability for the earlier year, resulting in a refund or credit of any excess tax paid. Treas. Reg. § 1.172–
1(d) (as amended in 1986).
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In order to take advantage of I.R.C. section 172, an individual must be
engaged in a business and the expenses incurred must relate to that
business.384 Generally, the NOL is the excess of business deductions over
the taxpayer’s gross income, subject to the following modifications: (1)
personal and dependency exemptions are disallowed; (2) nonbusiness
deductions are allowed only to the extent of nonbusiness income; (3)
capital losses in excess of capital gains are not deductible; and (4) no
exclusion of gain from the sale or exchange of qualified small business
stock under I.R.C. section 1202.385
Losses from casualties and thefts incurred by an individual in a
transaction entered into for profit or with regard to personal-use property
are treated as attributable to a business.386 With regard to personal-use
property, only losses allowable under I.R.C. section 165(c)(3), subject to
the I.R.C. section 165(h) limitations, are treated as business losses in
computing the NOL.387 In the case of an individual, the portion of the NOL
attributable to a casualty or theft loss can be carried back three tax years.388
Thus, greater tax relief is provided non-business casualty and theft losses
by the extension of the carryback period, thereby, increasing the number of
tax years over which the NOL can be absorbed.
B. GAIN FROM THE THEFT OF PROPERTY
Counterintuitively, a casualty or theft may result in taxable gain if the
property involved is adequately insured.389 Unless otherwise provided, gain
or loss realized on the disposition of property is recognized for tax
purposes.390 I.R.C. section 1033 provides for the nonrecognition of gain
realized on the involuntary conversion of property.391 The purpose of the
section is to relieve a taxpayer from unanticipated tax liability arising from
384. For purposes of the net operating loss deduction, employment constitutes a business. Lagreide
v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 508, 513 (1954).
385. I.R.C. § 172(c)–(d); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.172–3(a) (as amended in 1986); I.R.C. § 1202
(West 2017) (allowing an exclusion from income for fifty percent of the gain on the sale of qualified
small business stock held for more than five years).
386. § 172(d)(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.172–3(a)(3)(iii).
387. I.R.C. § 172(d)(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.172–3(a)(3)(iii). See supra text accompanying notes
338–60 (discussing the meaning of the phrase “arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, and other casualty, or
from theft” for the purposes of I.R.C. 165(c)(3)). See supra text accompanying notes 365-67 (detailing
the limitations applicable to personal casualty loss deductions under I.R.C. section 165(h)).
388. I.R.C. § 172(b)(1)(E)(i), (ii)(I).
389. Gain is amount by which the proceeds on the disposition of the property exceed the cost of the
property. I.R.C. §§ 61(a)(3), 1001(a) (West 2017). Loss is the amount by which the cost of the
property exceeds the proceeds on the disposition of the property. § 1001(a). A loss represents the
unrecovered cost of the property. § 1001(a). The “cost” of property is the basis of the property with
adjustments. I.R.C. §§ 1011(a), 1016 (West 2017).
390. § 1001(c).
391. I.R.C. § 1033(a) (West 2017). Section 1033 does not apply to losses. Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)–
1(a) (as amended in 1981).
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the involuntary conversion of property to the extent the taxpayer reinvests
the proceeds within the period required by statute without changing the
nature of the investment.392
At the election of the taxpayer, gain realized on an involuntary
conversion of property is not recognized if the money received by the
taxpayer is reinvested in property similar or related in service or use to the
converted property.393 However, gain is recognized to the extent the money
received on the conversion exceeds the cost of the replacement property.394
I.R.C. section 1033 may be elected whether the converted property is used
in a business, held for the production of income, or personal-use
property.395 Generally, the replacement period begins on the date of the
conversion and ends two years after the close of the first tax year in which
any part of the gain is realized.396 The basis of the replacement property is
the amount paid for the property reduced by any unrecognized gain.397
Example: Taxpayer’s classic automobile was stolen. The automobile had
a cost of $100,000. Within six months of the theft, Taxpayer received
insurance proceeds of $150,000. Taxpayer immediately acquires a
replacement classic automobile at a cost of $200,000.
The
replacement automobile qualifies as similar or related in service or use
to the stolen automobile. As a result of the theft, Taxpayer realized
$50,000 gain ($150,000 insurance proceeds minus $100,000 basis) but
recognizes $0 gain because all of the insurance proceeds were
reinvested. The basis of the replacement automobile is $150,000
($200,000 cost of the replacement automobile minus $50,000
unrecognized gain). If Taxpayer acquired a replacement classic
automobile at a cost of $125,000, Taxpayer realized $50,000 gain
($150,000 insurance proceeds minus $100,000 basis) and recognizes
$25,000 gain ($150,000 insurance proceeds minus $125,000 cost of
the replacement automobile).
The basis of the replacement
automobile is $100,000 ($125,000 cost of the replacement automobile
minus $25,000 unrecognized gain).

392. Willamette Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 126, 131 (2002).
393. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(A). Section 1033 is mandatory if property is converted directly into
property similar or related in service or use. § 1033(a)(1). Generally, the replacement property cannot
be acquired from a related person if the gain realized on the involuntary conversion exceeds $100,000.
§ 1033(i).
394. 1033(a)(2)(A).
395. J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 966 (LexisNexis
10th ed. 2012).
396. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(2)(B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1033(a)–2(c)(2) (as amended in 1981)
(providing detailed rules for the time and manner of making the election).
397. I.R.C. § 1033(b)(2); see also § 1223(1) (West 2017) (tacking the holding period of the
converted property onto the holding period of the replacement property for purpose of characterizing
gain or loss).
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For I.R.C. section 1033 to apply, the compulsory or involuntary
conversion of property must be the result of “destruction in whole or in
part, theft, seizure, or requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence
thereof.”398 Within the meaning of I.R.C. section 1033, an involuntary
conversion requires that the taxpayer’s property is no longer useful or
available to the taxpayer due to some outside force or agency.399 The term
“destruction” is equivalent to “casualty” in the sense of I.R.C. section
165(c)(3), only allowing a loss deduction with respect to personal-use
property if the loss arises from “fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty or
from theft.”400 In addition to casualty events, I.R.C. section 1033
specifically applies to the theft of property.401 For the purposes of I.R.C.
section 1033, the term “theft” is “a word of general and broad connotation
intended to cover and covering any criminal appropriation of another’s
property to the use of the taker, particularly including theft by swindling,
false pretenses, and any other form of guile.”402
To assure the continuation of investment, I.R.C. section 1033 requires
that the converted property and replacement property be “similar or related
in service or use.”403 Although the similar-or-related-in-service-or-use
standard is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code or the Treasury
Regulations, two tests have been established: (1) the functional test, and (2)
the investor test.404 The functional test looks at the functional similarities
between the properties, requiring the physical characteristics and end uses
of the converted and replacement properties to be closely similar.405 The
investor test focuses on the extent and type of the lessor’s management
activity, the amount and kind of services rendered by the lessor to the
tenants, and the nature of the business risks associated with the
398. § 1033(a).
399. C.G. Willis, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 468, 476 (1964), aff’d, 342 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.
1965); Willamette, 118 T.C. at 132.
400. Rev. Rul. 59–102, 1959–1 C.B. 200, 201. See supra text accompanying notes 338-60
(discussing the meaning of the phrase “arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, and other casualty, or from
theft” for the purposes of Section 165(c)(3)). For purposes of Section 1033, as long as the cause of the
destruction falls within the general concept of a casualty, the taxpayer does not have to satisfy the
requirement of “suddenness” that must be satisfied to qualify for a casualty loss deduction under
Section 165(c)(3). Rev. Rul. 59–102, 1959–1 C.B. 200.
401. I.R.C. § 1033(a).
402. Hope v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1020, 1033–1034 (1961), aff’d, 471 F.2d 738 (3rd Cir. 1973)
(citing Edwards v. Bromberg, 232 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1956)); see also Rev. Rul. 66–355, 1966–2
C.B. 302 (holding the unauthorized pledging of the taxpayer’s stock as collateral for the personal loan
by a financial manager constituted a theft for the purposes of I.R.C. Section 1033).
403. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(1).
404. Liant Record, Inc. v. Commissioner, 303 F. 2d 326 (2d Cir. 1962); see also Rev. Rul. 64–237,
1964–2 C.B. 319. A taxpayer replacing rental property with property owned and occupied by the
taxpayer does not satisfy the similar-or-related-in-service-or-use standard. Rev. Rul. 79–261, 1979–2
C.B. 295, 296.
405. Rev. Rul. 76–319, 1976–2 C.B. 242.
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properties.406 For example, a taxpayer, who owns and operates a light
manufacturing plant on the converted property and then owns and operates
a wholesale grocery warehouse on the replacement property, does not
satisfy the functional test.407 However, a taxpayer who owns and leases a
light manufacturing plant on the converted property and then owns and
leases a wholesale grocery warehouse on the replacement property,
satisfies the investor test.408
C. CHARACTERIZATION OF THEFT GAIN AND LOSS
The characterization of theft gain and loss is complex but essential to
the victims of crime. If a theft gain is characterized as ordinary gain, the
gain is taxed at ordinary tax rates that range from 10 percent to 39.6
percent.409 However, if a theft gain is characterized as capital gain, the gain
is taxed at preferential rates of 15 percent or 20 percent.410 With regard to a
theft loss, ordinary loss is deductible against ordinary income,411 while a
capital loss may be restricted as to the tax year of deductibility.412
Although the statutory treatment of capital gains varied over the
decades, the current preferential treatment for individual taxpayers is found
in I.R.C. section 1(h), which provides an alternative tax formula in
determining tax liability.413 Depending on the type of asset that generated
the gain, generally, long term capital gain is subject to three maximum
rates of tax:414 (1) 28 percent for collectible gain415 and section 1202
gain;416 (2) 25 percent for unrecaptured section 1250 gain;417 and (3) 15
406. Liant Record, 303 F.2d at 329; see also Rev. Rul. 64–237, 1964–2 C.B. 319.
407. Rev. Rul. 64–237, 1964–2 C.B. 319.
408. Id.
409. I.R.C. § 1 (a)-(d), (i) (West 2017).
410. § 1(h). Currently, preferential tax treatment for capital gains is not available to corporate
taxpayers. I.R.C. §§ 11, 1201(a) (West 2012).
411. I.R.C. §§ 62, 63 (West 2017).
412. I.R.C. §§ 1211, 1212 (West 2017).
413. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 31.01, at 31-3. For I.R.C. § 1(h) to apply,
the taxpayer’s activities for the tax year must generate net capital gain. I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 2017). The
term “net capital gain” means the excess of net long term capital gain (long term capital gains minus
long term capital losses) minus net short term capital loss (short term capital losses minus short term
capital gains). I.R.C § 1222(11) (West 2017). Capital gains and losses are long term if the asset was
held for more than one year and short term if the asset was held for not more than one year. § 1222(1)–
(4) (West 2017). To determine the holding period of property, the day of acquisition is excluded and
the day of disposition is included. Rev. Rul. 66–7, 1966–1 C.B. 188; see also I.R.C. § 1223(1) (West
2017) (tacking the holding period of the converted property onto the holding period of the property
acquired for the purpose of characterizing gain or loss).
414. I.R.C. § 1(h).
415. I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(F)(4)-(5), 408(m)(2) (West 2017). A “collectible” is defined to include any
work of art, rug or antique, metal or gem, stamp or coin, alcoholic beverage, or any other property
specified by the Secretary of the Treasury. § 408(m)(2).
416. I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(F)(4), (7). The term “section 1202 gain” means the gain on the sale of
qualified small business stock in excess of the amount of gain excluded from gross income under
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percent for adjusted net capital gain.418 Adjusted net capital gain is residual
long term capital gain plus qualified dividend income.419 For the highincome taxpayers who are subject to the 39.6 percent tax rate, the tax rate
on adjusted net capital gain increases to 20 percent.420 Capital gains may
also be subject to the 3.8 percent tax on net investment income under I.R.C.
section 1411.421
Contrary to the preferential tax treatment for capital gains, capital loss
is generally only deductible to the extent of capital gain.422 For individual
taxpayers, I.R.C. section 1211(b) limits the deduction of capital loss to the
amount of capital gain with any capital loss in excess of capital gain
deductible against ordinary income up to maximum of $3,000.423 Any
capital loss remaining is carried forward for into succeeding tax years,
retaining its original character as either long term capital loss or short term
capital loss.424 The capital loss carryover is subject to the same limitations
in the succeeding tax years until fully utilized.425
The general rule is that capital gain or loss is generated by the sale or
exchange of a capital asset.426 Unless character is statutorily provided,
capital gain and loss only result from dispositions that qualify as a sale or
exchange and property that qualifies as a capital asset.427 In addition to the
dispositions that are generally considered a sale or exchange, case law has
Section 1202. § 1(h)(7).
417. § 1(h)(1)(E), (h)(6) (West 2017). The term “unrecaptured section 1250 gain” means the gain
on the sale of depreciable real property attributable to depreciation deductions taken during the holding
period of the property. § 1(h)(6)(A)(i).
418. § 1(h)(1)(D), (h)(3). To the extent adjusted net capital gain would have been taxed at 10% or
15%, the preferential rate of tax is zero. § 1(h)(1)(B).
419. § 1(h)(3). The term “adjusted net capital gain” means the long-term capital gain other than
collectible gain, Section 1202 gain, and unrecaptured Section 1250 gain, plus qualified dividend
income. § 1(h)(3). Generally, qualified dividends are dividends distributed by U.S. corporations and
certain foreign corporations. § 1(h)(11)(B).
420. § 1(h)(1), (C), (D) (West 2017). The 39.6% bracket applies to individuals with taxable income
above the following amounts: $450,000 for married taxpayers filing joint returns; $425,000 for heads of
households; $400,000 for single taxpayers; and $225,000 for married taxpayers filing separately. §
1(i)(3). The threshold amounts are adjusted for inflation. § 1(i)(3)(C).
421. I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1), (c)(1) (West 2017). The net investment income tax is 3.8 percent of the
lesser of: (1) net investment income, or (2) modified adjusted gross income, over the threshold amount.
§ 1411(a)(1). Net investment income includes interest, dividends, royalties, and rents if not derived in
the ordinary course of business and net gain attributable to the disposition of property if the property is
not held in the ordinary course of business. § 1411(c).
422. I.R.C. §§ 165(f), 1211, 1212 (West 2017).
423. I.R.C. §§ 165(f), 1211(b).
424. I.R.C. §§ 165(f), 1212(b).
425. I.R.C. §§ 165(f), 1211(b), 1212(b). The unused capital loss carryovers expire with the death of
the taxpayer who sustained the losses. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 31.02[4], at
31-18. For corporation taxpayers, I.R.C. section 1211(a) limits the deduction of capital losses to the
amount of capital gains, with any unused capital losses carried back for three years and then carried
forward for five years as short term capital loss. I.R.C. §§ 165(f), 1211(a), 1212(a).
426. I.R.C. § 1222(1)–(4) (West 2017).
427. § 1222(1)–(4).
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determined whether other types of dispositions also satisfy the sale or
exchange requirement.428 In Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather
Co.,429 the Supreme Court held that the receipt of insurance proceeds as
compensation for the destruction by fire of a business plant did not
constitute a sale or exchange of property.430 Presumably, this result would
“also encompass losses from tortious or criminal conduct (e.g., negligence,
Nevertheless, the sale or exchange
theft, or embezzlement).”431
requirement is often provided by statute.432 For example, a loss resulting
from the worthlessness of stock or securities is deemed a loss from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset.433
I.R.C. section 1221 defines a “capital asset” as property held by the
taxpayer whether or not connected with the taxpayer’s business.434
However, the definition of a capital asset contains eight broadly interpreted
exceptions, including:435 (1) inventory and property held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of business; (2) depreciable property
and real property used in business; and (3) copyright, literary, musical, or
artistic composition, a letter, memorandum or similar property created by
the taxpayer.436 If property is held by the taxpayer as inventory437 or
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s
business,438 the disposition of the property always produces ordinary
income and ordinary loss.439 Self-created works of the taxpayer, such as a
copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or a letter or

428. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 32.01[1], at 32–3.
429. Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 248–49 (1941).
430. Id. at 248–49, 251.
431. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 32.01[2], at 32–5.
432. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 32.01[1], at 32–4.
433. I.R.C. § 165(g)(1) (West 2017). The term “security” means: (1) stock of a corporation; (2) a
right to subscribe for, or to receive, corporate stock; and (3) a bond, debenture, note, or certificate,
or other evidence of indebtedness issued by a corporation or by a government, with interest coupons
or in registered form.0 § 165(g)(2).
434. I.R.C. § 1221(a) (West 2017).
435. § 1221(a). Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
436. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1)–(3). The exceptions also include: (1) accounts or notes received for the
sale of inventory and performance of services; (2) publications of the U.S. government acquired other
than by purchase; (3) commodities derivative financial instruments held by a dealer; (4) clearly
identified hedging transactions; and (5) supplies regularly consumed in the ordinary course of business.
§ 1221(a)(4)–(8).
437. §§ 1221(a)(1), 1221(b)(1)(A). Inventory accounting must be used whenever “production,
purchase, or sale of merchandise is an income-producing factor.” Treas. Reg. § 1.471–1 (1960).
438. I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(1), 1231(b)(1)(B). In determining whether the taxpayer holds the property
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, the factors weighed by the court
include: the frequency and substantiality of the sales; extent of development activities and
improvements; and solicitation and advertising efforts. Suburban Realty Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d.
171, 176 (5th Cir. 1980). With regard to property held for multiple purposes, the Supreme Court
defined “primarily” to mean “principally” or “of first importance.” Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572
(1966).
439. I.R.C. §§ 1221 (a)(1), 1231(b)(1)(A), (B) (West 2017).
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memorandum, also produce ordinary gain and loss.440
With regard to depreciable business property and real property used in
the taxpayer’s business excluded from the definition of capital asset,441
I.R.C. section 1231 will determine the character of gain and loss if the
property is sold or exchanged and held for more than one year.442
Additionally, I.R.C. section 1231 will determine the character of gains and
losses from the compulsory or involuntary conversion of property used in
the taxpayer’s business and nonpersonal-use capital assets held for more
than one year.443 Generally, if the taxpayer’s aggregate gains exceed
aggregate losses, the gains and losses are characterized as long term capital
gains and losses.444 However, if the aggregate gains do not exceed the
aggregate losses, the gains and losses are ordinary.445
I.R.C. section 1231 affords special treatment to gain and loss arising
from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty or from theft of property used
in the taxpayer’s business and nonpersonal-use capital assets held for more
than one year.446 If the aggregate losses exceed the aggregate gains from
such events, the losses and gains are ordinary.447 However, if the aggregate
losses do not exceed the aggregate gains, the character of the casualty and
theft gains and losses is determined along with the other gains and losses
characterized under I.R.C. section 1231.448
Example: Construction equipment used in Taxpayer’s business was stolen
and not recovered. The equipment was insured. Taxpayer incurred a
$50,000 loss from the theft of a bulldozer and a $25,000 gain from the
theft of an excavator. In an unrelated transaction, Taxpayer

440. §§ 1221(a)(3)(A), 1231(b)(1)(C). Property received with a transferred basis from the creator
also falls within the exception, for example, property received by gift. I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(3)(C), 1015(a)
(West 2017). At the election of the taxpayer, the sale or exchange of musical compositions or
copyrights in musical works will not be treated as a noncapital asset. I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3).
441. I.R.C. § 1221(a)(2).
442. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(3). Depreciable property or real property used in the taxpayer’s
business held for more than one year is termed “property used in the trade or business.” §
1231(b)(1). “Property used in the trade or business” does not include: (1) inventory; (2) property
held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business; (3) copyright, literary,
musical, or artistic composition, a letter, memorandum or similar property created by the taxpayer;
and (4) publications of the U.S. government acquired other than by purchase. § 1231(b)(1)(A)–(D).
443. § 1231(a)(3), (4)(C). See supra text accompanying notes 398-402 (defining the types of events
that constitute a compulsory or involuntary conversion as the result of destruction, theft, or seizure, or
an exercise of the power of requisition or condemnation or threat or imminence thereof).
444. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1); see also § 1231(c) (providing recapture rules to prevent the manipulation
of the netting rules in order to maximize capital gains and ordinary losses).
445. § 1231(a)(2).
446. § 1231(a)(4)(C). See supra text accompanying notes 338-60 (discussing the meaning of the
phrase “arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, and other casualty, or from theft” for the purposes of I.R.C.
165(c)(3)).
447. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(4)(C).
448. § 1231(a)(3), (4)(C).
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experienced a $100,000 gain from the sale of a warehouse. All of the
property was depreciable property or real property used in Taxpayer’s
business and all were held for more than one year. Since the theft loss
of $50,000 exceeds the theft gain of $25,000, the loss and gain are
ordinary. The $100,000 gain from the sale of the warehouse is long
term capital gain. However, if the gain from the theft of the excavator
was $75,000, the casualty gain exceeds the casualty loss of $50,000,
and, therefore, the gain and loss are weighted with the gain of
$100,000 from the sale of the warehouse. As the aggregate gain of
$175,000 ($75,000 excavator plus $100,000 warehouse) exceeds the
$50,000 loss (bulldozer), the gains are long term capital gain and the
loss is a long term capital loss.
With regard to personal-use property, I.R.C. section 165 allows an
individual a loss deduction only if the loss arises from fire, storm,
shipwreck, or other casualty or from theft.449 Pursuant to I.R.C. section
165(h), however, the amount of the personal casualty losses are allowed
only to the extent that: (1) the personal casualty losses exceed $100 per
event, and (2) if the aggregate personal casualty losses exceed the
aggregate personal casualty gains, the net personal casualty loss exceeds
ten percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.450 In addition to
limiting the amount of deductible personal casualty losses, I.R.C. section
165(h) also determines the character of personal casualty gain and personal
casualty loss.451 If the aggregate personal casualty loss exceeds the
aggregate personal casualty gain, the losses and gains are ordinary. 452 If
the aggregate personal casualty gain exceeds the aggregate personal
casualty loss, all of the personal casualty losses are deductible and the gains
and losses are deemed to be gains and losses from the sale or exchange of
capital assets.453
I R.C. section 166 provides for a deduction for partially or wholly
worthless bad debts.454 The section applies to all bona fide debts whether
the origin of the obligation is the taxpayer’s business or a for-profit or
personal transaction.455 A bona fide debt is an obligation arising “from a

449. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (West 2017). See supra text accompanying notes 338-60 (discussing the
meaning of the phrase “arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, and other casualty, or from theft” for the
purposes of I.R.C. 165(c)(3)).
450. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(A).
451. § 165(h)(2).
452. See Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 250–251 (1941) (holding
that a casualty event is not a sale or exchange of property).
453. I.R.C. § 165(h)(2)(B). See supra text accompanying notes 364-67 (providing an example of the
application of I.R.C. section 165(h)).
454. I.R.C. § 166(a) (West 2017). The amount of the bad debt deduction is limited to the basis of
the obligation. § 166(b).
455. BITTKER, MCMAHON & ZELENAK, supra note 6, ¶ 17.01, at 17-2.
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debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid and enforceable obligation
to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money.456 The worthlessness of a
debt is determined considering all pertinent evidence, including the value
of any collateral, if any, and the financial condition of the creditor.457 As to
the tax treatment of a bad debt deduction, a business bad debt is an ordinary
deduction, while a nonbusiness bad debt is short term capital loss.458
In Revenue Ruling 77-383,459 the taxpayer had a personal savings
account at a bank.460 An employee of the bank embezzled large sums of
money from the bank, resulting in the bank becoming insolvent.461 The
Service found that the bank’s money, not the taxpayer’s money, was
embezzled and that the taxpayer’s loss only arose as an indirect result of
the embezzlement.462 The debtor-creditor relationship existed between the
taxpayer and the bank and not the taxpayer and the bank’s employee.463
The Service held that the loss sustained by the taxpayer was a nonbusiness
bad debt under I.R.C. section 166 and not a theft loss deductible under to
I.R.C. section 165.464 Thus, the deduction was a short term capital loss and
not an ordinary loss deduction.465
D. TREATMENT OF THEFT LOSS AND GAIN IN THE COMPUTATION OF
TAXABLE INCOME
In computing taxable income, a theft gain or loss may be treated very
differently for tax purposes depending on the circumstances that generated
the gain or loss. Income included in the victim’s income pursuant to the
Tax Benefit Rule is ordinary income taxed at regular tax rates.466 A gain
from theft of property is included in the victim’s income unless excluded
456. Treas. Reg. § 1.166–1(c) (as amended in 1986). Proof of bona fide debt requires an
affirmative showing of the existence, at the time of the transaction, of a real expectation of
repayment and intent to enforce the collection of the indebtedness. Van Anda’s Estate v.
Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1158, 1162 (1949), aff’d per curiam, 192 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1951).
457. Treas. Reg. § 1.166–2(a) (as amended in 1993). Nevertheless, if the surrounding
circumstances indicate that a debt is worthless and uncollectible, legal action to enforce payment is not
necessary. § 1.166–2(b).
458. I.R.C. § 166(a), (d)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.166–5(as amended in 1980). The term “nonbusiness
debt” is defined as a debt other than: (1) a debt created or acquired in connection with the business
of the taxpayer; and (2) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer’s
business. I.R.C. § 166(d)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.166–5(b).
459. Rev. Rul. 77–383, 1977–2 C.B. 66.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 67.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. I.R.C. § 166(d) (West 2017).
466. See supra text accompanying notes 368-78 (discussing the inclusion and exclusion of income
pursuant to the Tax Benefit Rule). See Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 8 (1952) (allowing an
examination of a prior tax year for the purpose of characterization).
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pursuant to the nonrecognition provision I.R.C. section 1033.467 Ordinarily,
theft gain or loss generates ordinary income or an ordinary deduction
because a theft does not satisfy the sale or exchange requirement for capital
treatment; however, the sale or exchange requirement may be satisfied
statutorily.468 Includable theft gain may be characterized as long-term
capital gain taxable at preferential tax rates, and a theft loss may be
characterized as capital loss subject to the limitations provided in I.R.C.
sections 1211 and 1212.469 Non-business bad debts are treated as short
term capital loss and subject to such limitations applicable to capital
losses.470
For an individual, I.R.C. section 62 identifies which allowable
deductions are deductible from gross income in computing adjusted gross
income. A theft loss and bad debt deduction incurred in the victim’s
business are taken into account in computing the victim’s adjusted gross
income.471 Also deductible from gross income in computing adjusted gross
income are theft losses characterized as capital losses and deductions
attributable to rents.472 Further, personal casualty losses to the extent of
personal casualty gains are deductible from gross income in computing
adjusted gross income.473
A theft loss generated by a for-profit activity and net personal casualty
loss are itemized deductions that reduce adjusted gross income in the
computation of taxable income.474 Fortunately, theft loss produced by a
for-profit activity and net personal casualty loss are not miscellaneous
itemized deductions, subject to the two percent of adjusted gross income
floor.475 Further, casualty and theft losses incurred in for-profit activities
and personal casualty losses are not subject to the overall limitation on
itemized deductions.476 If a taxpayer elects the standard deduction instead
467. See supra text accompanying notes 389-408 (explaining the application of I.R.C. section 1033,
allowing for the nonrecognition of realized gain as a result of the involuntary conversion of property).
468. See supra text accompanying notes 426-33 (discussing the characterization and treatment of
gains and losses).
469. See supra text accompanying notes 409-25 (discussing the characterization and treatment
of gains and losses).
470. I.R.C. § 166(d). See supra text accompanying notes 454-65 (discussing the characterization of
bad debt deductions). See supra text accompanying notes 422-25 (discussing the characterization and
treatment of gains and losses).
471. I.R.C. § 62(a)(1) (West 2017). With limited exceptions, the business cannot consist of the
performance of services as an employee. See § 62(a) (listing twenty-two items deductible from gross
income in computing adjusted gross income).
472. § 62(a)(3), (4).
473. I.R.C. § 165(h)(4)(A) (West 2017).
474. I.R.C. § 63(a), (d) (West 2017).
475. I.R.C. § 67(a), (b) (West 2017). Generally, miscellaneous itemized deductions are only
allowed to the extent total miscellaneous itemized deductions exceed two percent of the embezzler’s
adjusted gross income for the tax year. §67(a).
476. I.R.C. § 68(a), (c) (West 2017). Generally, a taxpayer whose adjusted gross income exceeds a
threshold amount must reduce the amount of allowable itemized deductions by the lesser of: (1) three
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of itemizing deductions, a deduction for such theft losses incurred during
the tax year cannot be claimed.477
E. FRAUDULENT INVESTMENT SCHEMES
From a tax perspective, the distinction between a loss from criminal
fraud or embezzlement and an unsuccessful investment is critical. Whether
an investor can claim a theft loss for an investment in a fraudulent scheme
are factual determinations that are difficult to make with certainly.478
If an investment loss is the result of fraud or embezzlement, the
taxpayer typically has an ordinary loss that is deductible from ordinary
income479 and may produce a NOL.480 The theft of personal-use property
produces a loss deduction pursuant to I.R.C. section 165(c)(3), but subject
to characterization and limitations provided in I.R.C. 165(h).481 However, a
fraud or embezzlement occurring in a transaction entered into for profit
produces an ordinary loss deduction pursuant to I.R.C. section 165(c)(2),
not subject to I.R.C. section 165(h).
If a loss is not the result of fraud or embezzlement, an investment loss
is characterized as a capital loss that is deductible only to the extent of
capital gain with any excess capital loss limited to $3,000 for the tax
year.482 The taxpayer may carry forward any capital loss remaining to
succeeding tax years, subject to the same limitations.483 As capital gain is
less likely than ordinary income to be recurring income, a substantial
capital loss may never be fully deducted in the investor’s lifetime.484 If a
transaction is treated as creating a debtor-creditor relationship, a
nonbusiness bad debt is treated as a short term capital loss.485 If a

percent of the excess of adjusted gross income over the threshold amount; or (2) 80 percent of the
otherwise allowable itemized deductions. § 68(a), (b).
477. I.R.C. § 63(a), (b).
478. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 2.03.
479. See supra text accompanying notes 422-25 (discussing the characterization and treatment of
gains and losses). See supra text accompanying notes 365-67 (detailing the limitations applicable to
personal casualty loss deductions under I.R.C. Section 165(h)).
480. See supra text accompanying notes 379-88 (describing the availability and application of the
NOL provisions).
481. I.R.C. § 165(a), (c) (West 2017).
482. See supra text accompanying notes 422-25 (discussing the characterization and treatment of
gains and losses).
483. See supra text accompanying notes 422-25 (discussing the characterization and treatment of
gains and losses)
484. Jeffrey P. Coleman & Jennifer Newsom, Can an Investment Become a Theft for Tax
Purposes?, 84 FLA. B. J. 27, 27 (2010).
485. Rev. Rul. 77–383, 1977–2 C.B. 66, 67; see also Rev. Rul. 69–458, 1969-2 C.B. 33 (holding
that losses sustained on purchases of undelivered stock from a securities corporation that subsequently
becomes bankrupt are deductible short term capital losses under I.R.C. section 166(d)); Cf. Morris Plan
Co. of St. Joseph v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1190 (1940); McKinley v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 59
(1960) (allowing a theft loss deduction if the “loan” was in fact a fraudulent transaction because no real
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transaction qualifies as both a deductible loss and a bad debt, the deduction
is treated as a bad debt deduction under I.R.C. section 166.486
1. Ponzi Schemes
In 2009, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 2009-9487 and Revenue
Procedure 2009-20488 to provide guidance as to the tax treatment of loss
incurred in a certain type of fraudulent investment commonly known as a
“Ponzi” scheme. Revenue Ruling 2009-9 involves a taxpayer who invested
funds with an individual who held himself out to the public as an
investment advisor and security broker.489 Based on positive investment
reports, the taxpayer invested additional funds and reinvested any reported
income, receiving a distribution only once during an eight-year period.490
Ultimately, the purported advisory and brokerage activity was discovered
to be a fraudulent investment arrangement.491 The reported investment
activities and resulting income amounts were fictitious and any payments
to investors were made from amounts that other investors invested in the
Ponzi scheme.492 The individual’s actions constituted criminal fraud or
embezzlement under the law of the jurisdiction in which the transactions
occurred.493
In Revenue Ruling 2009-9, the Service provides guidance as to the
proper tax treatment of losses resulting from Ponzi schemes:494
A loss from criminal fraud or embezzlement is a theft loss
under I.R.C. section 165 and not a capital loss;
A theft loss is deductible under I.R.C. section 165(c)(2),
not I.R.C. section 165(c)(3), as an itemized deduction that
is not subject to the personal loss limits in I.R.C. section
165(h), or the limits on itemized deductions in I.R.C.
sections 67 and 68;
A theft loss is deductible in the year the loss is discovered,
provided that the loss is not covered by a claim for
reimbursement or recovery with respect to which there is a
reasonable prospect of recovery;
The amount of a theft loss is generally the amount invested
in the arrangement, less amounts withdrawn, if any,
debt was created).
486. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182, 187 (1934).
487. Rev. Rul. 2009–9, 2009–14 I.R.B. 735.
488. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749.
489. Rev. Rul. 2009–9, 2009–14 I.R.B. 735.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 2.02.
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reduced by reimbursements or recoveries, and reduced by
claims as to which there is a reasonable prospect of
recovery. Where an amount is reported to the investor as
income prior to discovery of the fraudulent arrangement
and the investor includes that amount in gross income and
reinvests this amount in the arrangement, the amount of the
theft loss is increased by the reinvested amount; and
A theft loss may create or increase a net operating loss
under I.R.C. section 172.495
Revenue Procedure 2009-20 establishes an optional “safe harbor”
treatment for taxpayers that experience losses in a “specified fraudulent
arrangements,” often referred to as Ponzi schemes.496 If certain conditions
are met, Revenue Procedure 2009-20 provides: (1) a uniform manner for
determining the taxpayer’s theft losses; (2) a method to avoid potentially
difficult problems of proof in determining the extent previously reported
income was fictitious or a return of capital; and (3) alleviation from
compliance and administrative burdens.497 Generally, the taxpayer may
elect the safe harbor if the following requirements are satisfied: (1)
specified fraudulent arrangement; (2) qualified loss; (3) qualified investor;
and (4) discovery year.498 If the taxpayer elects the safe harbor the
taxpayer’s losses from the investment are treated as theft losses pursuant to
Revenue Ruling 2009-9.499
Specified Fraudulent Arrangement—The “lead figure” perpetrating
the fraud receives cash or property from investors; claims to earn income
for the investors; reports to the investors income amounts that are fictitious;
makes payments, if any, of purported income to some investors from
amounts other investors invest; and appropriates some or all of the
investor’s cash or property.500
Qualified Investor—A qualified investor is a U.S. person who
qualifies to deduct the theft loss; had no prior knowledge of the fraudulent
nature of the investment arrangement; and transferred cash or property to a

495. Rev. Rul. 2009–9, 2009–14 I.R.B. 735, 738. The holding also provides: (6) a theft loss in a
transaction entered into for profit does not qualify for the computation of tax provided by I.R.C. Section
1341; and (7) a theft loss in a transaction entered into for profit does not qualify for the application of
I.R.C. Sections 1311–1314 to adjust tax liability in years that are otherwise barred by the statute of
limitations. Rev. Rul. 2009–9, 2009–14 I.R.B. 735, 738.
496. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 1. Revenue Procedure 2009–20 applies to losses
for which the discovery year is a tax year beginning after December 31, 2007. Rev. Proc. 2009–20,
2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 7.
497. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 2.04.
498. Id. § 4.
499. Id. § 2.02.
500. Id. § 4.03.
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specified fraudulent arrangement.501
Qualified Loss—A qualified loss is a loss resulting from a specified
fraudulent arrangement causing the loss, if either: (a) the lead figure is
charged by indictment or information (not withdrawn or dismissed) under
state law or federal law with the commission of fraud, embezzlement, or
similar crime; or (b) the lead figure is the subject of a state or federal
criminal complaint (not withdrawn or dismissed) on similar grounds and
either (i) the complaint alleged an admission of the crime by the lead
figure; or (ii) a receiver or trustee was appointed.502 In 2011, Revenue
Procedure 2009-20 was modified to allow for the death of the lead figure
that may foreclose criminal theft charges.503
Discovery Year—A qualified investor’s discovery year is the taxable
year of the investor in which the indictment, information, or complaint is
filled.504
Pursuant to Revenue Procedure 2009-20, the deductible amount is
calculated as follows: (1) multiply the amount of the qualified investment
by (a) 95 percent, for a qualified investor that does not pursue any potential
third-party recovery; or (b) 75 percent, for a qualified investor that is
pursuing or intends to pursue any potential third-party recovery; minus (2)
the sum of any actual recovery and any potential insurance recovery.505
The qualified investor may have income or an additional deduction in a
subsequent tax year depending on the actual amount of the loss that is
eventually recovered.506 Excluded from the definition of a qualified
investment are cash or property that the investor invests in a fund or other
entity that invested in a specific fraudulent arrangement.507
A taxpayer who does not elect the safe harbor option is subject to all
the generally applicable provisions governing the deductibility of losses
under I.R.C. section 165.508
For example, a taxpayer seeking a theft loss deduction must establish
that the loss was from theft and that the theft was discovered in the year the
taxpayer claims the deduction. The taxpayer must also establish that no
claim for reimbursement of any portion of the loss exists with respect to
which there is a reasonable prospect of recovery in the taxable year in
which the taxpayer claims the loss.509

501. Id. § 4.03. In addition, the specified fraudulent arrangement cannot be a tax shelter. Id. § 2.03.
Equity owners in a pass-through entity can elect safe harbor treatment to claim losses allocable to them
as owners of the pass-through entity. I.R.S. CCA 201445009 (2014).
502. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 4.02.
503. Rev. Proc. 2011–58, 2011–50 I.R.B. 849.
504. Rev. Proc. 2009–20, 2009–14 I.R.B. 749 § 4.04.
505. Id. § 5.02.
506. Id.
507. Id. § 4.06(2)(c).
508. Id. § 8.01.
509. Id.

MANOLAKAS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2016]

TAXATION OF THIEVES AND THEIR VICTIMS

2/9/2017 3:46 PM

85

2. Other Types of Fraudulent Investment Schemes
Not all fraudulent investment schemes are Ponzi-type schemes to
which certainty and guidance is provided by Revenue Ruling 2009-9 and
Revenue Procedure 2009-20. As to other types of fraudulent investment
schemes, the difficult question remains as to whether an allowable loss is a
theft loss producing an ordinary deduction or an investment loss producing
a capital loss.
With regard to investments in stocks, direct privity between the
wrongdoer and the investor is required for characterization as a theft loss,
which is often problematic because investors must establish that the
wrongdoer intended to deprive them of their funds.510 In Paine v.
Commissioner,511 the taxpayer was a stockbroker who purchased stocks on
the open market.512 The decline in value of the stock was the result of the
corporate officers engaging in fraudulent and illegal acts that artificially
inflated the value at which the stock was traded.513 The taxpayer was
denied a theft loss because he failed to prove that, under state law, the
misrepresentations by the corporate officers were made with the specific
intent to criminally appropriate funds from the taxpayer.514 The Tax Court
noted that the taxpayer had not purchased the stock from the persons who
made the misrepresentations but on the open market.515
However, if the requirement of privity between the buyer and seller is
satisfied, a theft loss deduction is allowed. In Revenue Ruling 1977-18,516
the Service concluded that a theft loss occurred under circumstances in
which shareholders voted to merge their corporation into another on the
basis of fraudulent financial statements.517 Soon after the exchange, the
acquiring corporation filed for bankruptcy and the shareholders of the
target experiences substantial losses.518 It was proven that the responsible

510. Brian Elzweig & Valerie Chambers, Modernizing the Theft Loss Deduction for Victims of
Securities Frauds and Ponzi Schemes, 30 no. 9 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1, 3 (2011). See
Bellis v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 354, 358 (1973) (denying a theft loss deduction because at the time of
the stock purchase the sellers did not misrepresent the financial condition of the corporation although it
subsequently went into bankruptcy). See Lombard Bros., Inc. v. United States, 893 F.2d 520, 523 (2d
Cir. 1990) (denying a theft loss deduction because, although the margin calls were conceded to be a
wrongful taking, intent to deprive the taxpayer of funds was not shown).
511. Paine v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 736 (1975).
512. Id. at 737.
513. Id. at 740 n.4.
514. Id. at 742. The taxpayer also failed to prove his reliance on the corporate officer’s
misrepresentations and the amount of any theft loss. Id.
515. Id. See also Rev. Rul. 77–17, 1977–1 C.B. 44 (holding that the taxpayer was not allowed a
theft loss for stock purchased on the open market).
516. Rev. Rul. 77–18, 1977–1 C.B. 46.
517. Id.
518. Id.
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officials knowingly made false representations to the shareholders of the
merged corporation with the intent to induce them to vote for the merger
and the shareholders of the merged corporation relied upon the false
financial statements at the time they voted to exchange their stock.519 The
exchange was theft by false pretenses under state law.520
The Service also allowed a theft loss, in Revenue Ruling 71-381,521 for
amounts loaned to a corporation based upon information contained in
fraudulent financial statements of the corporation provided by the
corporation’s president. The president of the corporation was later
convicted of violating state securities law by issuing false and misleading
financial documents.522 In this case, the corporate president, “knowingly,
with intent to defraud, obtained money by means of false representations,
and was found guilty under New Jersey Statutes of a misdemeanor.”523
In Viezke v. Commissioner,524 the Tax Court upheld the taxpayer’s
theft loss for funds invested in what was purported to be an insurance
company but was in reality a stock swindle.525 The perpetrators were
criminally indicted on charges of violating state securities law by selling
unregistered securities through an unregistered agent.526 The Tax Court
stated that the fact the perpetrators were convicted of a crime other than
theft does not exclude from consideration the existence of a theft.527 “We
need not determine the exact nature of the crime under Indiana law. . . .
The record convinces us that Patterson and Zak parted petitioner from his
money by deceit and trick amounting to a criminal appropriation with
felonious intent and that by so doing a theft occurred both within the
meaning of Indiana law and of section 165(e).”528
IV. CONCLUSION
The taxation of thieves and their victims presents many complex and
unique issues. Any discussion of the taxation of thieves begins with the
decision by the Supreme Court that illegal income, along with legal
income, is includable in income. Not surprisingly, criminals do not file tax
returns or report illegal income thereby incurring tax penalties both civil
and criminal. For victims of theft, the involuntary loss of money or
property is, to a limited extent, accommodated by the tax laws. The
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.

Id. at 47.
Id.
Rev. Rul. 71–381, 1971–2 C.B. 126.
Id.
Id. at 127.
Vietzke v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 504 (1961).
Id. at 510.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 510.
Id. at 511.
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manner of accommodation and the factual distinctions made are often
complicated and inequitable. However, the greatest disservice to victims of
theft is the priority given the claims of the government for unpaid taxes,
penalties, and interest over the claims of victims for restitution. The claims
of victims of theft, who are often coping with emotional and financial
distress, should never be subordinate to the claims of the government for
unpaid taxes.

